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INTRODUCTION
Inducing governmental organizations to do the right thing is the
central problem of public administration. Especially sharp challenges
arise when “the right thing” means executing not only a primary
mission but also constraints on that mission (what Philip Selznick aptly
labeled “precarious values” 1). In a classic example, we want police to
prevent and respond to crime and maintain public order, but to do so
without infringing anyone’s civil rights. In the federal government, if
Congress or another principal wants an executive agency to pay
attention not only to its mission, but also to some other constraining or
even conflicting value—I will call that additional value, generically,
“Goodness” 2—that principal has several choices. Congress can
somehow impel the agency to try to seed the constraining value widely
throughout its ranks—for example, by using supervision tools or
incentives to get many agency employees to pay attention to Goodness. 3
Or Congress can empower some other federal organization more closely
aligned with Goodness to play an augmented role in the agency’s
affairs. 4 This Article provides the first theoretical account of an
1 See PHILIP SELZNICK, LEADERSHIP IN ADMINISTRATION: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION
119–33 (1957).
2 I capitalize the term Goodness to indicate that the word is functioning as a stand-in for
something of value, not as an endorsement of any particular normative judgment.
3 See, e.g., Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of MultipleGoal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 35 (2009) (describing a “range of methods” to induce
agencies to pursue secondary goals). These approaches can be harder or softer. One interesting
new soft approach in the European Union is termed the “open method of coordination.” See, e.g.,
MILENA BÜCHS, NEW GOVERNANCE IN EUROPEAN SOCIAL POLICY: THE OPEN METHOD OF
COORDINATION (2007).
4 This approach is the subject of a rash of articles in the past several years examining the
rationales and results of “overlapping” and “underlapping” jurisdiction among agencies. See, e.g.,
William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA
L. REV. 1 (2003); see also Todd S. Aagaard, Regulatory Overlap, Overlapping Legal Fields, and
Statutory Discontinuities, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 237 (2011); Keith Bradley, The Design of Agency
Interactions, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 745 (2011); Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in
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important third approach: furthering Goodness by giving it an
institutional home, a subsidiary agency office I call an “Office of
Goodness.” 5 Offices of Goodness have often been created by Congress
when it has sought to instill in particular agencies values that are
important to the moving Members but less than central to the agencies;
presidents, too, have created them for a variety of political ends.
Activities by Offices of Goodness possess a logic and function
worthy of academic recognition and explication; both policymakers and
scholars should care about how, and when, Offices of Goodness work.
But while Offices of Goodness are frequently established in federal
agencies, they are all but invisible in prior scholarship. 6 The resulting
knowledge gap is consequential. For example, the Obama
Administration has just placed a new Office of Goodness within the
National Security Agency, to increase the presence of civil liberties
values in surveillance policy development; 7 without sufficient attention
Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2012); Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and
Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201; Jason Marisam,
Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 181 (2011); Jason Marisam, Interagency
Administration, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 183 (2013).
5 My Offices of Goodness have very little in common with Gary Lawson’s Goodness and
Niceness Commission; Lawson used “Goodness and Niceness” to signal a maximally vague
delegation, where I use Goodness as a stand-in for more definite values. See Gary Lawson, The
Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1239 (1994).
6 An extremely useful exception is Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy
Decisionmaking in Administrative Agencies, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 75 (2008), which analyzes the
Privacy Offices at DHS and the Department of State, and offers thoughts about why, when faced
with similar issues, the former managed a far more robust set of interventions in its agency than
the latter. It is, of course, also possible to find references here and there that acknowledge the
strategy. See, e.g., MARK H. MOORE & MARGARET JANE GATES, INSPECTORS-GENERAL: JUNKYARD
DOGS OR MAN’S BEST FRIEND? 15 (1986) (“In sum [in passing the 1978 Inspectors General Act],
Congress chose the usual governmental response to an emerging political demand for some new
purpose or value to be expressed in the operations of government—the creation of a separate,
strengthened administrative unit whose primary goal is to advance the purpose or value that
justified its creation.”); JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO
AND WHY THEY DO IT 371 (1989) (“If the organization must perform a diverse set of tasks, those
tasks that are not part of the core mission will need special protection. This requires giving
autonomy to the subordinate tasks subunit (for example, by providing for them a special
organizational niche) and creating a career track so that talented people performing non-mission
tasks can rise to high rank in the agency.”).
7 See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in a Press Conference (Aug. 9,
2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/09/remarks-presidentpress-conference (explaining that the National Security Agency is “taking steps to put in place a
full-time civil liberties and privacy officer”); Edward Moyer, NSA Job Post for ‘Civil Liberties &
Privacy Officer’ Goes Live, CNET (Sept. 20, 2013), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-5760399238/nsa-job-post-for-civil-liberties-privacy-officer-goes-live. The President has also stated his
support for a related, though slightly different, approach with respect to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court, “calling on Congress to authorize the establishment of a panel of advocates
from outside government to provide an independent voice in significant cases before the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court.” President Barack Obama, Speech on N.S.A. Phone Surveillance
(January 17, 2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/18/us/politics/obamas-speechon-nsa-phone-surveillance.html.
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to design details, such an office is likely to accomplish very little. For an
Office of Goodness to actually increase Goodness in its agency, its staff
must skillfully use a toolkit constrained by the Office’s placement within
the agency they seek to influence, and they must avoid the twin shoals of
impotence or capture/assimilation. This Article analyzes the relevant
dynamics. I begin by describing a paradigmatic Office of Goodness, the
Department of Homeland Security’s Office for Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties, and four issues in which it was involved between 2009 and
2012. These examples then inform the Article’s theoretical contribution,
a presentation of available tools and how the Office’s relationships with
other stakeholders can increase or undermine its staff’s influence and
commitment, which I suggest are the prerequisites for effectiveness.
At an increased level of generality, the Article also contributes to
the “structure and process” strand of positive political theory. The
germinal articles in this literature were by the three collaborators known
collectively as McNollgast; 8 they argued that Congress can “stack the
deck” in favor of agency outcomes it prefers, and facilitate its own
focused oversight, by delineating the structure and process agencies
must follow as they formulate policy. Structure and process theorists
have analyzed numerous delegation choices through this lens, including
notice and comment rulemaking, 9 choice of agency mission and
jurisdiction, 10 use of “impact assessments,” 11 and constraints on
appointment and removal of personnel. 12 Other political scientists
studying agency design focus more on the President and less on
Congress. 13 Either way, as a prominent recent article by Elizabeth Magill
and Adrian Vermeule summarizes,

8 Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as
Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987) [hereinafter McNollgast,
Administrative Procedures]; Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, & Barry R. Weingast,
Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control
of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989); see also Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Designing
Bureaucratic Accountability, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 91 (1994).
9 See sources cited supra note 8.
10 E.g., Gersen, supra note 4; Jonathan Macey, Organizational Design and the Political Control
of Administrative Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93 (1992).
11 E.g., McNollgast, Administrative Procedures, supra note 8, at 263–66; see also Bamberger &
Mulligan, supra note 6.
12 See, e.g., Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization
and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 459 (2008) (“By placing limits on the
President’s power to appoint and remove independent agency heads as well as mandating limits
on the number of the President’s own partisans that can be appointed, Congress made use of an
institutional design that sought to limit presidential control of independent agencies.”). For a
guide to the public choice literature on agency design, see Jacob E. Gersen, Designing Agencies, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 333 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne
Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010).
13 E.g., DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN (2003).
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this literature for the most part treats “the agency” as a unit and asks
how and why institutions such as Congress and the President impose
various structural and procedural requirements on agencies. In other
words, this literature (for the most part) asks how the black box
should be shaped, not what lies inside it. 14

This Article (like Magill and Vermeule’s piece) takes as its subject
the complex interactions among agency personnel inside that black box,
and how those interactions are affected by and themselves affect
outsiders.
Scholarship written in the field of public administration or
bureaucratic theory has a different blind spot. Research about how
bureaucracies work 15 focuses almost entirely on operational
bureaucracies—bureaus that themselves issue regulations or carry out
programs, or offices that supervise such bureaus, not offices that operate
by influence instead of chain-of-command authority. 16 Work in
bureaucratic theory thus fails to offer a full account of the networks of
authority and influence that constitute modern federal agencies. This
Article’s observations demonstrate the importance of that gap, and
begin to fill it, by focusing in particular on personnel who offer advice,
rather than run agency operations, and elaborating many ways this

14 Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J.
1032, 1035 n.1 (2011). The point essentially holds for David Lewis’s book, PRESIDENTS AND THE
POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN, supra note 13, because Lewis treats individual bureaus separately,
rather than as parts of agencies. Magill and Vermeule examined how administrative law doctrine
empowers or disempowers particular actors within federal agencies.
15 Classics include HERBERT KAUFMAN, THE FOREST RANGER: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE
BEHAVIOR (1960). See also ANTHONY DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY (1967); MICHAEL LIPSKY,
STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES (1980); JERRY
L. MASHAW ET AL., SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS: A STUDY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION HEARING SYSTEM (1978); JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY, supra note 6. Or,
more recently, see, e.g., DANIEL CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY:
REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862–1928
(2001); DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND
PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA (2010); STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND
PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT (2008); AMY B.
ZEGART, FLAWED BY DESIGN: THE EVOLUTION OF THE CIA, JCS, AND NSC (1999); MarianoFlorentino Cuéllar, Coalitions, Autonomy, and Regulatory Bargains in Public Health Law, in
PREVENTING CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE IN REGULATION AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 326
(Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2013); Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic
Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN? 267 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds.,
1989). Two sources providing helpful guides to the public choice part of the literature are Ronald
Wintrobe, Modern Bureaucratic Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE: A HANDBOOK 429
(Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997), and Terry M. Moe, The Positive Theory of Public Bureaucracy, in
PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE: A HANDBOOK 455 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997).
16 One insightful exception is ROBERT A. KATZMANN, REGULATORY BUREAUCRACY: THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND ANTITRUST POLICY (1980).
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distinction makes a difference. The novel topic, that is, is soft rather
than hard institutional design in federal agencies. 17
Part I sets the stage, identifying definitional features of an Office of
Goodness, and describing the structure and authorities of one such
office in particular, the Department of Homeland Security’s Office for
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL). CRCL sits in the DHS Office of
the Secretary; it employs about a hundred civil servants, who carry out
tasks ranging from administration of the Department’s Equal
Employment Opportunity program to civil rights inspection of
immigration detention facilities to civil liberties review of classified
information sharing agreements. 18 It makes an ideal ground for this
study because it deals with subjects of high intragovernmental conflict
and large public importance, and because much of its work has come to
light in Freedom of Information Act document disclosures and
investigative reporting. In Part II, I turn to four important controversies
in which CRCL was a participant: the DHS role in information sharing
relating to the Occupy movement; review of electronic device border
search policy; Border Patrol’s policy relating to interpretation assistance
for local law enforcement; and the inter-agency negotiation over
guidelines governing data ingestion and retention by the National
Counterterrorism Center. All the information reported comes from
publically available sources, which are cited, although I build, as well, on
my experience as the presidentially appointed (but not Senate
confirmed) Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. (Of course the
discussion here is my own and does not represent the views of the
Department of Homeland Security or the Administration more
generally.) I tell these stories in some detail in order to ground the
subsequent analysis.
Part III increases the analytic altitude and analyzes more
systematically the ways in which Offices of Goodness intervene in
agency operations. These interventions use a variety of methods,
including:
 Inclusion in policy formulation working groups
 Clearance authority
 Advice
 Training and technical assistance
 Program or operational review, including data analysis
 Complaint investigation
 Outreach to outside groups
17 See Adrian Vermeule, Soft Institutional Design, JOTWELL (Dec. 3, 2013),
http://adlaw.jotwell.com/soft-institutional-design.
18 See, e.g., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES, ANNUAL
REPORT FY 2011 (2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/crcl-annual-report-fy2011-final.pdf.
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 Generation of documents
 Congressional reporting
Each method comes with its own risks and benefits, which are
discussed.
And increasing the elevation another 10,000 feet, in Part IV, I
examine in more detail the relationships that either support or
undermine Office influence and commitment to Goodness, its assigned
value. Both influence and commitment, I argue, are continually under
threat, and both depend crucially on external reinforcement, whether
from Congress, the White House, non-governmental organizations, the
courts, or other agencies. Again, I develop the dynamics in some detail.
It has recently become a commonplace observation that the power
of the presidency has expanded to the point that tripartite separation of
powers model, which relies on Congress and the courts to rein in the
Executive Branch, may not be up to the task. Much scholarship (and
perhaps even practice) now emphasizes, instead or in addition, internal
accountability mechanisms. 19 Neal Katyal, for example, describes
“internal separation of powers” methods, to “create checks and balances
within the executive branch.” 20 He notes that “[t]he apparatuses are
familiar—separate and overlapping cabinet offices, mandatory review of
government action by different agencies, civil-service protections for
agency workers, reporting requirements to Congress, and an impartial
decision-maker to resolve inter-agency conflicts.” 21 Likewise, Jack
Goldsmith celebrates “something new and remarkable: giant distributed
networks of lawyers, investigators, and auditors, both inside and outside
the executive branch, that rendered U.S. fighting forces and intelligence
services more transparent than ever, and that enforced legal and
political constraints, small and large, against them.” 22
Both scholars and the American polity, would, to quote Gillian
Metzger, “benefit[] from paying greater attention to internal
administrative design, and in particular . . . analyzing what types of
administrative structures are likely to prove effective and appropriate in

19 As Gillian Metzger has emphasized, the various internal and external methods interact
crucially. See Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External
Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423, 426 (2009). See also, e.g., Anne Joseph O’Connell, The
Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94
CALIF. L. REV. 1655 (2006) (analyzing the structure of federal intelligence offices); cf. MarianoFlorentino Cuéllar, “Securing” the Nation: Law, Politics, and Organization at the Federal Security
Agency, 1939–1953, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 587 (2009) (analyzing the structure of the Federal Security
Agency).
20 Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2318 (2006).
21 Id.
22 JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11,
at xi–xii (2012).
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different contexts.” 23 Without taking a stand on the overall separation of
powers issues, in my view, the Office of Goodness strategy, already used
by Congress and other principals, can be at least partially effective and
appropriate. This Article raises the strategy’s visibility in scholarship,
placing it more prominently on the menu of internal separation of
powers devices for it to be further analyzed and assessed.
I. WHAT IS AN OFFICE OF GOODNESS?
A.

Key Characteristics

By “Office of Goodness” I mean an office within an operational
agency that has each of three features (although many of the
observations that follow might shed light on offices that have one or two
of these characteristics, even if not all three):
First, Offices of Goodness are advisory rather than operational.
Offices of Goodness help other parts of the agency get work done; they
are not the offices (or bureaus, to use the nomenclature most common
in scholarship 24) that themselves carry out the agency’s mission. This
means that Offices of Goodness must operate by persuasion or coercion
of others. Scholarship examining the dynamics of bureaucratic
autonomy is highly relevant by analogy, 25 but for Offices of Goodness,
power lies less in autonomy than in influence—the ability to thwart
another office’s autonomy. 26

Metzger, supra note 19, at 425.
See, e.g., DAVID E. LEWIS & JENNIFER L. SELIN, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
SOURCEBOOK
OF
UNITED
STATES
EXECUTIVE
AGENCIES
41,
available
at
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/csdi/Sourcebook12.pdf:
23
24

‘Bureau’ is a general term that refers to many different sub-units within larger
departments that have different names such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Internal Revenue Service, or National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Like
departments, bureaus vary in size and significance. In many departments the subdepartment bureaus have significant autonomy and authority; many departments are
better characterized as holding companies of a number of distinct agencies rather than
one large agency. The autonomy of sub-department agencies derives from a number of
sources. Most have legal authority delegated to the bureau chief directly by legislation,
rather than to the department secretary or the President. Large bureaus are also
generally headed by Senate-confirmed political appointees, making bureau chiefs
accountable to congressional committees directly rather than through higher
departmental officials.
25 The leading source on agency autonomy and the techniques used to obtain and sustain it is
CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY, supra note 15.
26 See PHILIP B. HEYMANN, THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 150–52 (1987) (analyzing
persuasion in federal agencies).
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Second, Offices of Goodness are value-infused. 27 The observations
here apply to offices that are explicitly assigned to further a particular
value that is not otherwise primary for the agency in which they sit. That
value could be civil rights, consumer welfare, fiscal rectitude, etc. The
Article calls it Goodness, but is agnostic on whether Goodness is
actually good. A note in this regard: Where the value in question is
“lawfulness,” the Office of Goodness is likely to be the agency’s Office of
General Counsel. Jack Goldsmith writes, for example, of “the CIA’s 150
or so lawyers,” naming them the “street-level bureaucrats” responsible
for enforcing “compliance with the bevy of laws that Congress imposes
and that the executive branch translates into more detailed executive
orders, regulations, and directives.” 28 Valuable (though limited) work
has been done on general counsels’ offices; 29 this Article builds on that
scholarship, adding detailed description of an Office of Goodness that is
not an Office of General Counsel, and also moving up one level of
generality, to think about this type of office as an analytic category. The
work done on Ombudsman’s offices is also relevant; although the values
of “responsiveness” or “good government” typically assigned to such
offices 30 are rather diffuse.
Third, Offices of Goodness are internal and dependent on their
agency. The dynamics of a fully internal office are very different from
one that has structural separation and independence. I deal here with
non-independent internal offices, although of course independence is
not dichotomous but rather exists along a spectrum. 31 In my view, this is
why the burgeoning work on the far more independent offices of
Cf. SELZNICK, supra note 1.
GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT, supra note 22, at 93. See also, e.g., A. John Radsan,
Sed Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes: The CIA’s Office of General Counsel?, 2 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. &
POL’Y 201 (2008).
29 For analysis of the dynamics of federal Offices of the General Counsel, see, for example,
sources cited supra note 28 and Laura A. Dickinson, Military Lawyers on the Battlefield: An
Empirical Account of International Law Compliance, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2010) (about Judge
Advocate General’s Corps lawyers); Harold Hongju Koh & Aaron Zelinsky, Practicing
International law in the Obama Administration, 35 YALE J. INT’L. L. ONLINE 4 (2009); Magill &
Vermeule, Allocating Power, supra note 14, at 1032, 1058–62, 1072–73; Thomas O. McGarity, The
Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57 (1991).
30 Classic treatments of ombuds offices include: WALTER GELLHORN, OMBUDSMAN AND
OTHERS: CITIZENS’ PROTECTORS IN NINE COUNTRIES (1967); WALTER GELLHORN, WHEN
AMERICANS COMPLAIN: GOVERNMENTAL GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES (1966); Larry B. Hill,
Institutionalization, the Ombudsman, and Bureaucracy, 68 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1075 (1974); see
also, e.g., Paul R. Verkuil, The Ombudsman and the Limits of the Adversary System, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 845 (1975); Shirley A. Wiegand, A Just and Lasting Peace: Supplanting Mediation with the
Ombuds Model, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 95 (1996).
31 See, e.g., Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and
Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111 (2000); Lisa Schultz Bressman
& Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599 (2010); Kirti
Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (And Executive Agencies), 98
CORNELL L. REV. 769 (2013).
27
28
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Inspectors General is enlightening but distinct. As that work describes,
notwithstanding their organizational chart placement, Inspectors
General have, at least since 1978, answered much more to Congress
than to their Department heads. 32
B.

The DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties

The head of the Department of Homeland Security Office for Civil
Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL)—a presidential appointee reporting
directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security—is required by Congress
to “oversee” DHS “compliance with constitutional, statutory, regulatory,
policy, and other requirements relating to the civil rights and civil
liberties of individuals affected by the programs and activities of the
Department. . . .”33 The relevant statutes empower the office to deal with
both general policy development and review, and with more specific
(and individual) civil rights complaints. CRCL’s statutes instruct the
office to assist the Secretary and Department offices in policy
development and implementation, including by periodically reviewing
policies and procedures “to ensure that the protection of civil rights and
civil liberties is appropriately incorporated into Department programs
and activities.” 34 The statutes also require the office to review and assess
information and investigate complaints concerning civil rights and civil
liberties abuses by DHS employees—including, explicitly called out by
statute—alleged “profiling on the basis of race, ethnicity, or religion.” 35
In addition, CRCL is required to more generally “ensure that [the
Department] has adequate procedures to receive, investigate, respond
to, and redress” civil liberties complaints. 36
32 See CARMEN R. APAZA, INTEGRITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN GOVERNMENT: HOMELAND
SECURITY AND THE INSPECTOR GENERAL (2011); PAUL C. LIGHT, MONITORING GOVERNMENT:
INSPECTORS GENERAL AND THE SEARCH FOR ACCOUNTABILITY (1993); INSPECTORS GENERAL: A
NEW FORCE IN EVALUATION (Michael Hendricks et al. eds., 1990); MOORE & GATES, supra note 6;
Michael R. Bromwich, Running Special Investigations: The Inspector General Model, 86 GEO. L.J.
2027 (1998); Ryan M. Check & Afsheen J. Radsan, One Lantern in the Darkest Night: The CIA’s
Inspector General, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 247 (2010); Margaret J. Gates & Marjorie F.
Knowles, The Inspector General Act in the Federal Government: A New Approach to
Accountability, 36 ALA. L. REV. 473 (1984); Kathryn E. Newcomer, The Changing Nature of
Accountability: The Role of the Inspector General in Federal Agencies, 58 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 129
(1998); Shirin Sinnar, Protecting Rights from Within? Inspectors General and National Security
Oversight, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1027 (2013).
33 See 6 U.S.C. § 345(a)(4) (2012). The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the office
and directed the Secretary to appoint its head, who was instructed much more briefly to “review
and assess information alleging abuses of civil rights, civil liberties, and racial and ethnic profiling
by employees and officials of the Department[.]” Pub. L. 107-296, § 705(a)(1), 116 Stat. 2135, 2220
(2002).
34 6 U.S.C. § 345(a)(3) (2012).
35 6 U.S.C. § 345(a)(1) (2012).
36 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-1(a)(4) (2012).

SCHLANGER.36.1.2 (Do Not Delete)

2014]

10/27/2014 5:17 PM

O F F I C E S O F GO O D N E S S

63

So that CRCL can carry out these tasks, the Secretary of Homeland
Security is instructed to ensure that the CRCL Officer:
(1) has the information, material, and resources necessary to fulfill
the functions of such officer;
(2) is advised of proposed policy changes;
(3) is consulted by decision makers; and
(4) is given access to material and personnel the officer determines to
be necessary to carry out the functions of such officer. 37

And, crucially, Office is subjected to specific congressional
reporting obligations. The CRCL Officer is required to file quarterly
Congressional reports about the office’s activities, including, most
importantly, “the type of advice provided and the response given to such
advice;” and “a summary of the disposition of . . . complaints, the
reviews and inquiries conducted, and the impact of the activities of such
officer.” 38 Correspondingly, the Secretary is required to file an annual
congressional report “detailing any allegations of [civil rights or civil
liberties] abuses . . . of this section and any actions taken by the
Department in response to such allegations.”39
Congress has also made subsequent more specific use of CRCL and
its head, instructing the Secretary to “consult” with the CRCL Officer in
developing several specified programs; 40 requiring CRCL to develop or
certify civil liberties training for particular personnel; 41 and asking for
CRCL-authored reports both before and after programs are
implemented. 42 In addition, DHS Secretaries have publically assigned a
variety of tasks to CRCL, declaring the office responsible for training,
policy assessment and recommendations, and particular participation in

Id. § 2000ee-1(d).
Id. § 2000ee-1(f)(2)(B), (D).
39 6 U.S.C. § 345(b) (2012).
40 See 6 U.S.C. § 124h (requiring the Secretary to consult with the CRCL Officer in
establishing a DHS Fusion Center Initiative); 6 U.S.C. § 1138 (same, for certain public
transportation research and development projects); 6 U.S.C. § 1168 (same, for railroad security
research and development); 6 U.S.C. § 1185 (same, for bus security research and development).
41 See 6 U.S.C. § 124h(c)(4)(A)(ii) (requiring each DHS officer or intelligence analyst assigned
to a fusion center to undergo civil liberties training “developed, supported, or sponsored
by . . . the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the Department”); 6 U.S.C. § 124i (same,
for Information Sharing Fellows).
42 See 6 U.S.C. § 1138 (requiring the CRCL Office to conduct appropriate reviews of certain
DHS public transportation research and development projects); § 1168 (same, for railroad
security research and development); 6 U.S.C. § 1185 (same, for bus security research and
development); Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No.
110-53, § 511, 121 Stat. 266, 317–24 (requiring the CRCL Officer to submit a report to Congress
and others on the civil liberties impact of the Fusion Center Initiative); § 512 (same, Information
Sharing Fellows Program); § 521 (same, Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination
Group); § 1523 (same, for Northern Border Railroad Passenger program).
37
38
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specified Departmental tasks and processes. Several of these are
discussed in Part II, below.
CRCL is very different from the civil rights offices of most federal
agencies.
In
contrast
with
CRCL’s
inward-looking
advisory/review/watch-dog function, most agency offices of civil rights
(OCRs) combine a more substantively limited role inside the agency—
administering equal employment opportunity programs—with a more
operational regulatory role outside the agency—enforcing the
antidiscrimination obligations of supported organizations. 43 (The
Department of Agriculture’s Civil Rights Office, described in the Border
Patrol Interpretation section below (Part II.C), is a partial exception
from this general pattern. And the most well-known of the federal civil
rights offices, the Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division, is
different altogether; as a litigating office of the Justice Department, its
primary mission is to sue non-federal defendants, so it is nearly entirely
outwardly focused.) But while DHS CRCL is unusual among cabinet
department civil rights offices, it is far from unique in its structure.
DHS’s foundational 2002 statute birthed not only CRCL, but also its
DHS sibling, the Privacy Office, along similar lines. 44 And a 2007 statute
that confirmed and expanded CRCL’s authority similarly either
confirmed or led to the creation of analogous offices—although
generally combining privacy and civil liberties, and not mentioning civil
rights—within the Departments of Justice, Defense, State, Treasury, and
Health and Human Services; the Central Intelligence Agency; and the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 45 The structure of each
office varies; some are led by presidential appointees, others by political
appointees who must be approved by the Presidential Personnel Office
but are technically appointed by the Department Head; still others are
led by career staff. 46 Expanding the field of vision beyond either civil
43 See, e.g., STEPHEN C. HALPERN, ON THE LIMITS OF THE LAW: THE IRONIC LEGACY OF TITLE
VI OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1995) (describing operations of Education OCR); JEREMY
RABKIN, JUDICIAL COMPULSIONS: HOW PUBLIC LAW DISTORTS PUBLIC POLICY (1989) (same for
Health, Education and Welfare OCR); Olatunde Johnson, Beyond the Private Attorney General:
Equality Directives in American Law, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1339 (2012) (same for HUD Office of Fair
Housing and Equal Opportunity); Sara Rosenbaum & Joel Teitelbaum, Civil Rights Enforcement
in the Modern Healthcare System: Reinvigorating the Role of the Federal Government in the
Aftermath of Alexander v. Sandoval, 3 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 215 (2003) (same for
HHS OCR).
44 See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-296, § 222, 116 Stat 2135, 2155 (2002)
(codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. §142 (2012)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-2 (2012).
45 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-1(a); see also Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004, Pub. L. 108-458, §§ 1011, 1061, 118 Stat. 3638, 3658–59, 3688 (creating a Civil Liberties
Protection Officer within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and a Privacy and
Civil Liberties Officer within the Executive Office of the President).
46 For example, the Defense Department’s Senior Agency Official for Privacy, and Civil
Liberties Officer is a career member of the armed services. See Michael L. Rhodes, Director of
Administration and Management (OSD), U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., http://www.defense.gov/bios/
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rights or civil liberties, offices that satisfy the three “Offices of
Goodness” criteria set out above are scattered throughout government.
They have titles like the Department of Energy’s Office of Economic
Impact and Diversity, or the Internal Revenue Service’s Office of the
Taxpayer Advocate. 47 Many are called Ombudsman’s offices. 48 It is
beyond the scope of this Article to either catalog or discuss all of these
offices—the point here is only that their use by Congress is a general
regulatory strategy worthy of analysis.
II. WHAT DO OFFICES OF GOODNESS DO? FOUR VIGNETTES.
In this section, I describe four civil rights controversies in which
CRCL played a role, 49 to thicken the description of available strategies
and challenges. I look in turn at (1) the DHS role in information sharing
relating to the Occupy movement in late 2011; (2) DHS electronic
device border search policy; (3) Border Patrol’s policy relating to
interpretation assistance for Northern Border law enforcement agencies;
and (4) the inter-agency negotiation over guidelines governing data
retention by the National Counterterrorism Center. For those interested
in homeland security matters, the vignettes should be worthwhile in
their own right. For those whose interest in this article is based on its
contribution to administrative and bureaucratic theory, I hope the same
will be true, but for each controversy, the relevant tools mentioned in
the vignettes are discussed more thoroughly in Part III.

biographydetail.aspx?biographyid=164 (last visited Aug. 27, 2014); About the Office, DEFENSE
PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OFFICE, http://dpclo.defense.gov/CivilLiberties/AbouttheOffice/
DPCLOStructure (last visited Aug. 27, 2014). The Department of Justice Chief Privacy and Civil
Liberties Officer is a political appointee. And the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Civil Liberties Protection Officer is a career civil servant.
47 For a discussion of the IRS Office of Taxpayer Advocate, see IRS OVERSIGHT BD.,
OVERSIGHT OF THE OFFICE OF TAXPAYER ADVOCATE: PRINCIPAL FINDINGS AND ACTIONS (2002),
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/IRSOB/reports/Documents/taxpayer_advocate_
oversight.pdf.
48 Outward-facing ombudsman’s offices are embedded, for example, in, inter alia, the
Securities and Exchange Commission; Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services, Office of Public Engagement; Consumer Product Safety
Commission, Office of Education, Global Outreach and Small Business Ombudsman; and Small
Business Administration. DHS also has a freestanding Ombudsman for Citizenship and
Immigration Services. For background, see Admin. Conf. of the United States, The Ombudsman
in Federal Agencies, Recommendation 90-2, 1 C.F.R. § 305.90-2 (1993); ADMINISTRATIVE
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, THE OMBUDSMAN: A PRIMER
FOR FEDERAL AGENCIES (1991). On internal federal ombudsman’s offices, for workers, see D.
Leah Meltzer, The Federal Workplace Ombuds, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 549, 559–97 (1998).
49 My own personal involvement in three of these controversies appears in the documents
cited; however, I played no direct role in the Occupy issue.
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DHS and Occupy

September 2011 saw the birth of the Occupy Wall Street protest
movement in New York City; over subsequent weeks and months,
Occupy grew and spread across the country. In many cities, Occupy
began that fall with live-in encampments in parks and other public
spaces. Nearly everywhere, city governments and law enforcement
eventually enforced various curfew and anti-camping rules and shut
down the Occupy camps. The Department of Homeland Security was
involved in several ways. Occasionally a unit of DHS was a target of a
protest. For example, an “Occupy Stewart” protest was held in
November 2011 in front of the Stewart Detention Center, an
immigration detention facility in Lumpkin, Georgia. 50 The Coast Guard
and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) (and to a lesser extent
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or ICE) also monitored what
was going on at several seaport protests, which had the potential of
affecting their operations. 51 And DHS’s Federal Protective Service,
which is the law enforcement agency with responsibility for most of the
nation’s federal buildings, took note of protests in the vicinity of those
buildings 52 and was the agency that enforced encampment prohibitions
in (apparently) one location. 53
For the Federal Protective Service and for state and local law
enforcement (often working through “fusion centers,” entities that are
not part of the federal government, but are partially funded by, and
networked with, DHS), the civil liberties challenge was to maintain
“situational awareness,”—that is, knowledge of what was going on
sufficient to facilitate appropriate police planning and presence—
without crossing over into more intrusive and objectionable monitoring

50 Jim Mustian, Crowd Calls for Closing of Stewart Detention Center; Two Arrested, LEDGERENQUIRER (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.ledger-enquirer.com/2011/11/18/1824958/crowd-callsfor-closing-of-stewart.html.
51 See E-mails among DHS staff during November and December 2011, in 5/3/2012 DHS
FOIA DOCUMENT RESPONSE 95, 197, 292–94, 305–07, https://www.documentcloud.org/
documents/353138-latest-batch-of-dhs-occupy-documents-contains.html (last visited Aug. 27,
2014) (discussing protests at several sea ports).
52 See Jason Leopold, DHS Emails Question Federal Law Enforcement’s Role in Violence at
Occupy Wall Street and Oakland Rallies, TRUTHOUT (Mar. 28 2013), http://www.truth-out.org/
news/item/15389-newly-released-dhs-emails-questions-federal-law-enforcements-role-inviolence-at-ows-rallies-in-oakland-and-new-york
(citing
DHS
FOIA
REQUEST,
http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/625736-ows-nppd-region-1-final.html (last visited
Aug. 27, 2014)).
53 See, e.g., E-mail from DHS spokesman Chris Ortman, to DHS Secretary’s Office staff (Nov.
1, 2011, 11:45 AM), in 5/3/2012 DHS FOIA DOCUMENT RESPONSE, supra note 51, at 45
(statement on the record describing FPS role in Portland Schrunk Plaza arrests).
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of First Amendment protected protest activity. 54 Scattered throughout
thousands of pages of relevant documents obtained via Freedom of
Information Act request from DHS by Truthout, a non-profit
independent news organization, 55 is evidence of efforts to meet that
challenge. For example, one document describes the stance of the
Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC), a fusion
center in San Francisco: “Other than a few smashed windows at a
number of banks, today’s events have remained First Amendment
protected protest activities. NCRIC is not monitoring protected activity,
but is in touch with the Oakland EOC in the event circumstances
change.”56 And when in October 2011, a report summarizing the
Occupy protests to date and attributed to the DHS National Protection
and Programs Directorate’s Office of Infrastructure Protection was
posted (and then reported and reposted on Rolling Stone’s blog site); the
report was immediately pulled down; senior Department officials
explained it was unauthorized and out of compliance with DHS policy. 57
Even situational awareness activities received some criticism from
the civil liberties left—an article in Salon, for example, described them as
a “policy of daily spying on activists” 58; this was then labeled on the New
York Times website by a civil liberties advocate as “inappropriate
surveillance of protesters associated with Occupy Wall Street.” 59 But
such criticism fails to engage the reasonable needs of law enforcement
agencies with responsibilities for federal buildings. It’s not obviously
unreasonable for Federal Protective Service personnel to notice who is
planning large events near the buildings they protect; in fact, it might be
irresponsible for police not to notice such events.

Cf. 2 SELECT COMM. STUDY TO GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
RIGHTS OF AMERICANS 211–23 (1976), available at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/
pdfs94th/94755_II.pdf (describing COINTELPRO).
55 See Jason Leopold, DHS Turns Over Occupy Wall Street Documents to Truthout,
TRUTHOUT (Mar. 20, 2012), http://truth-out.org/news/item/8012-dhs-turns-over-occupy-wallstreet-documents-to-truthout#files.
56 E-mail from [redacted], to [redacted] (Nov. 2, 2011, 8:58 PM), in 5/3/2012 DHS FOIA
DOCUMENT RESPONSE, supra note 51, at 95.
57 The report remains available at http://www1.rollingstone.com/extras/13637_DHS%20IP%
20Special.pdf. The back and forth on pulling it down is discussed in e-mail traffic FOIA’d and
posted by Truthout. See Jason Leopold, Top DHS Officials Went Ballistic Over Rolling Stone
Contributor Michael Hastings’ OWS Report, Internal Emails Show, TRUTHOUT (July 31, 2012),
http://truth-out.org/news/item/10634-dhs-on-rolling-stone-reporter-michael-hastingss-owsreport-he-can-be-provocative-help-him-understand-our-mission. The e-mails themselves are
posted at https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3. documentcloud. org/documents/405431/ows-finalrelease-package-part2.pdf, at 78, 94.
58 Natasha Lennard, DHS Had Policy of Daily Spying on Activists, SALON (Apr. 3, 2013),
http://www.salon.com/2013/04/03/dhs_had_policy_of_daily_spying_on_activists.
59 Jameel Jaffer, Privacy is Worth Protecting, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2013, 10:00 AM),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/06/09/is-the-nsa-surveillance-threat-real-orimagined.
54

AND THE
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Units of DHS designated to help “fuse” information for many law
enforcement agencies—the DHS National Operations Center and also
DHS intelligence analysts assigned to the fusion centers—did not have
such situational awareness needs. Accordingly, the challenge for them
was a little bit less challenging; because their mission is more limited
(covering homeland security matters only) a cleaner solution is possible.
For example, when Chicago’s police department asked the National
Operations Center to circulate to law enforcement in seven other cities
an “RFI” (Request for Information) on Occupy encampments and
arrests, 60 that request was first distributed but then quickly recalled by
top management, who explained:
DHS I&A [Office of Intelligence & Analysis] personnel—both at
Headquarters and in the field—may NOT be engaged in any efforts
to gather information on First Amendment-protected activities that
have no direct nexus to violence or that are otherwise outside the
scope of DHS I&A authorities. Such inquiries should be strictly
limited to law enforcement channels. 61

So far I’ve quoted various DHS actors’ nods towards First
Amendment values. But what about CRCL? CRCL’s involvement had
several related strands, described below. CRCL’s training role may have
raised awareness of First Amendment red flags, and also ratified CRCL’s
role and expertise. In addition, CRCL used that role and expertise to
explain and underscore the importance of avoiding First Amendment
infringements. And finally, in some limited situations, CRCL had
clearance authority, so that CRCL approval was more or less required
for promulgation of a document.
Training. In the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007, Congress required that each DHS officer or
intelligence analyst assigned to a fusion center undergo civil liberties
training “developed, supported, or sponsored” by CRCL. 62 The same law
likewise required that each fusion center provide “appropriate privacy
and civil liberties training” for all personnel, “in coordination with”
both the DHS Privacy Office and CRCL. 63 The training provided is
limited: CRCL gives the DHS intelligence analysts just a few hours’
overview of civil rights and civil liberties background, and trains trainers
(and provides materials) for the fusion center personnel. Critics have

60 See E-mails from Chicago Police Department Officials, to Other Police Department
Officials, in 5/3/2012 DHS FOIA DOCUMENT RESPONSE, supra note 51, at 245–57.
61 E-mail from [redacted], to [redacted] (Nov. 9, 2011, 5:44 PM), in 5/3/2012 DHS FOIA
DOCUMENT RESPONSE, supra note 51, at 251.
62 6 U.S.C. § 124h(c)(4)(A)(ii) (2012).
63 6 U.S.C. § 124h(i)(6) (2012).
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suggested this is inadequate 64—although perhaps it is sufficient for
raising awareness, if not for creating experts. In any event, the training
requirement does introduce each of the intelligence analysts to the
existence and role of CRCL. The results are evident in the Occupy FOIA
document in one e-mail from an employee at the Office of Intelligence
& Analysis to a National Operations Center intelligence analyst, who
had received a law enforcement request for information about Occupy
protests. The e-mail warned:
[P]lease be very cautious in responding to requests related to
constitutionally protected activities. Feel free to reach out to our
CR/CL office if you have any doubt when asked to support
requirement[s] you feel are questionable prior to taking any action. 65

Similarly, after Pittsburgh’s municipal Office of Emergency
Management and Homeland Security (not part of DHS) distributed a
“Threat Assessment” about Occupy Pittsburgh, 66 two DHS employees
who saw this document became concerned that it “might be advocating
surveillance and other countermeasures to be employed against
activities protected under the 1st Amendment,” and contacted CRCL to
seek some kind of responsive training document “so that in the future
[the local authors of the Threat Assessment] have a greater awareness of
how to develop intelligence assessments that don’t undermine
Constitutionally protected speech and assembly rights[.]” 67
Technical assistance. More directly within DHS’s own walls, staff
from DHS’s Office of Intelligence & Analysis explained in an October 17
e-mail that they were receiving numerous “questions and requests for
information regarding Occupy Wall Street from a number of
component partners and intelligence officers.” The e-mail explained
their first answer: “Recognizing that this is a first amendment-protected
activity, we have recommended (on an ad hoc basis when we received
requests) that our Intelligence Officers refer inquiries to Fusion Centers
and avoid the topic altogether.” But the e-mail requested more formal
guidance from CRCL and the DHS Privacy Office. 68

64 See, e.g., PERMANENT SUBCOMM. INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. HOMELAND SECURITY & GOV’T
AFFAIRS, FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR AND INVOLVEMENT IN STATE & LOCAL FUSION CENTERS 49
(2012), available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/report_federal-support-for-andinvolvement-in-state-and-local-fusions-centers.
65 E-mail from [redacted], to [redacted] (Dec. 12, 2011, 1:48 PM), in 5/3/2012 DHS FOIA
DOCUMENT RESPONSE, supra note 51, at 188.
66 PITTSBURGH OFFICE OF EMERGENCY MGMT. & HOMELAND SEC., THREAT ASSESSMENT
(2011), available at http://nigelparry.com/enginefiles/uploads/occupyassessment.pdf.
67 E-mail from [redacted], to [redacted] (Oct. 7, 2011, 10:04 AM), in DHS FOIA DOCUMENT
RESPONSE (PART 1) 2, http://truth-out.org/files/12-0048-First-Interim-Release_OWS_Part1.pdf.
68 See E-mail from Shala Byers, to [redacted] (Oct. 17, 2011, 11:30 AM), in DHS FOIA
DOCUMENT RESPONSE (PART 1), supra note 67, at 5.
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Privacy Office and CRCL staff explained to the Office of
Intelligence & Analysis manager who requested the guidance that
simply referring the inquiries to Fusion Centers might “give the
appearance that DHS is attempting to circumvent existing restrictions,
policies, and laws.” The right approach, they argued, was that “DHS
should not report on activities when the basis for reporting is political
speech,” and should “also be loath to pass DHS requests for more
information on the protests along to the appropriate fusion centers
without strong guidance that the vast majority of activities occurring as
part of these protests is protected.” 69 Not that there was a ban on
reporting: “Persons demonstrating illegal or suspicious behavior and
attempting to use the protests to obscure their activity could be
reported, as long as there is no attempt to link the suspicious/illegal
behavior to first amendment protected activity.” 70
The FOIA’d e-mails include resulting guidance promulgated by
Office of Intelligence & Analysis leadership to DHS intelligence analysts.
It stated:
Activities such as speech and assembly (both of which are implicated
in the planned “occupy” protests) are protected by the First
Amendment and generally DHS would not collect information or
report on these types of activities unless we had a compelling interest
to do so. Below is some general guidance that we hope you find
helpful.


The government may never collect or disseminate
information based solely on First Amendment protected
activities, or conduct investigations on that basis.



Generally, reporting should be about the violence or
criminality of a particular individual or group. Reporting on
activities without a nexus to violence or criminality often
raises First Amendment concerns.
o

To justify research into and creation of a product
containing First Amendment-protected activity,
personnel should consider whether they have a
lawful predicate (e.g. a lawful purpose to perform
their authorized law enforcement functions or other
activities, that is not based on the protected activity
itself).

o

Once a lawful predicate has been established,
personnel should ensure the scope of the research
and reporting on First Amendment-protected

69 E-mail from Privacy Office staff, to [redacted] (Oct. 17, 2011, 12:37 PM), in DHS FOIA
DOCUMENT RESPONSE (PART 1), supra note 67, at 85.
70 Id.
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activity is limited to the threat posed. This is often
referred to as congruence.


The treatment of groups that may be involved in the First
Amendment protected activity or related events should be
even-handed and free of bias (e.g., not reporting more
extensively or negatively on one group based on their
viewpoint alone).

The e-mail closed with an expression of collegiality: “Please let us
know if you have any other questions, or if you require CRCL support
in any other way. The CRCL office has been extremely helpful and
responsive on this issue and they stand ready to assist.” 71
The e-mails include other evidence of more particularized advice
seeking and giving. One episode involved a DHS intelligence analyst
who asked about an incident in which an SUV was set on fire. He
explained:
I ran across this today and was interested in a possible write up of the
event for the state and locals. Before I spent the time writing on this,
however, I’d like to know what objections CRCL might pose to such
a product concerning the Occupy movement—which has thus far
been nonviolent. 72

The e-mail chain includes debate among CRCL staff members
about whether any reporting on the incident, at all, would be
appropriate in light of the DHS mission. What was sent back to the
intelligence analyst notes that CRCL staff were:
particularly concerned about attribution of the incident. The article
notes that the police say they don’t know who set the fire or why they
did it, and while some of the graffiti contains slogans consistent with
some of the Occupy movement’s protests, the police say it would be
“unfair to blame any one group” for the incident, and the
spokesperson for Occupy Eugene denounced the event and said it
was not part of their tactics. Unless there is other intelligence that
indicates that the vandalism can be attributed to the group, the
product would have to be very careful not to attribute the incident to
the movement. 73

Accordingly,
[i]f I&A believes the incident in Eugene merits nationwide reporting,
it would be preferable for I&A to write up the incident in a manner
71 E-mail from Shala Byers, to Ann C. Wessel, in DHS FOIA DOCUMENT RESPONSE (PART 1),
supra note 67, at 61.
72 E-mail from [redacted], to [redacted] (Oct. 24, 2011, 4:39 PM), in DHS FOIA DOCUMENT
RESPONSE (PART 1), supra note 67, at 13.
73 E-mail from [redacted], to [redacted], in DHS FOIA DOCUMENT RESPONSE (PART 1), supra
note 67, at 47.
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that takes care not to attribute the action to Occupy (absent further
information), rather than to write a general product about Occupy
and add to that product a write-up of the incident (as the context of
the product would make it difficult to convey that we have no
information that the incident may be fairly attributed to Occupy,
rather than someone merely sympathetic to their ideology).
Generally, it would be difficult for DHS to justify a product on the
Occupy movement at this time. As you note, the movement has been
largely non-violent, and what criminal activity has taken place has
mostly been of the civil disobedience variety (failure to
secure/overstaying permits, non-violent resistance to arrest), with
occasional violent resistance to being removed from a
location/arrested, etc., and it is unclear what is appropriately
attributable to the Occupy movement versus individuals who may
later enter into a conflict with policy. Other concerns appear to be
health and safety related (use of heating equipment, disposal of trash,
etc). As these concerns generally are localized and not related to
domestic terrorism, to our knowledge, it would be difficult for DHS
to justify a product on what is largely First Amendment protected
activity that doesn’t appear to have a nexus to a DHS mission. 74

The intelligence analyst decided not to write the report.
Clearance authority. CRCL had not always played this influential a
role in intelligence reporting at DHS. In fact, in April 2009, an Office of
Intelligence & Analysis report on “Right-Wing Extremism”75 was issued
over CRCL’s objection. 76 The report was marked “For Official Use
Only” 77 but was widely distributed to law enforcement agencies, and
promptly leaked and posted online. 78 Defining right-wing extremism to
include groups “that are mainly antigovernment, rejecting federal
authority in favor of state or local authority, or rejecting government
authority entirely,” as well as “groups and individuals that are dedicated
Id.
See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE & ANALYSIS, RIGHTWING
EXTREMISM: CURRENT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CLIMATE FUELING RESURGENCE IN
RADICALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/right
wing.pdf.
76 See Tom Brune, Homeland Security Admits Error with Extremism Report, NEWSDAY (Apr.
17,
2009),
www.newsday.com/long-island/politics/homeland-security-admits-error-withextremism-report-1.1219261. The story is told in DARYL JOHNSON, RIGHT-WING RESURGENCE:
HOW A DOMESTIC TERROR THREAT IS BEING IGNORED (2012), written by the intelligence analyst
who drafted the Right-Wing Extremism paper.
77 The FOUO designation was supposed to bar distribution outside of the government. See
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., MGMT. DIRECTIVE SYS., SAFEGUARDING SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
(FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY) INFORMATION (2005), available at https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
assets/foia/mgmt_directive_110421_safeguarding_sensitive_but_unclassified_information.pdf. It
has since been officially supplanted by the designation “Controlled Unclassified Information.” See
Exec. Order No. 13,556, 75 Fed. Reg. 68,675 (Nov. 4, 2010).
78 The leak was to Rodger Hedgecock. JOHNSON, RIGHT-WING RESURGENCE, supra note 76, at
3.
74

75
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to a single issue, such as opposition to abortion or immigration,” it
warned that gun control opponents and veterans were plausible recruits
to violent extremism, and cast aspersions on Republicans more
generally by stating that opposition to the Obama administration’s
policy positions was “galvaniz[ing]” extremists. 79 The resulting furor
from conservative constituencies, 80 and then from both Democrats and
Republicans in Congress, 81 considerably enhanced CRCL’s authority;
the Secretary apologized to veterans for the report 82 and an internal
directive was issued requiring clearance of all non-classified intelligence
analysis by CRCL personnel, as well as by Privacy and the Office of the
General Counsel. The clearance authority was not absolute, but to issue
a document over the leadership-level objection of one of those offices,
Intelligence & Analysis was required to appeal to the Deputy
Secretary—a significant augmentation of the reviewing offices’
influence. 83
Returning to the Occupy issue, what’s notable in the Occupy FOIA
releases is that there is no evidence of an actual DHS intelligence report
about Occupy. This kind of product would have been subject to CRCL’s
clearance authority. Perhaps that’s because I&A leadership lacked
interest in such a product. Or perhaps it’s because clearance would have
been implausible. As one of the e-mail chains between two CRCL
employees notes:
W/r/t a larger report on the Occupy movement, do you mean that
you don’t think CRCL could clear on any product on OWS [Occupy
Wall Street], generally? I tend to agree that it would be difficult to
Id. at 242.
See, e.g., Michelle Malkin, Confirmed: The Obama DHS Hit Job on Conservatives is Real,
MICHELLE MALKIN (Apr. 14, 2009), http://michellemalkin.com/2009/04/14/confirme-the-obamadhs-hit-job-on-conservatives-is-real (“[T]he piece of crap report issued on April 7 is a sweeping
indictment of conservatives . . . .”). Numerous organizations responded by calling for the removal
of Secretary Napolitano. She responded with an apology and a promise to revamp the intelligence
product clearance process, including by augmenting the authority of CRCL. Jackie Kucinich,
Napolitano Atones for DHS Report, ROLL CALL (May 7, 2009), http://www.rollcall.com/issues/54_
127/-34696-1.html.
81 See, e.g., Letter from Congressman Bennie Thompson to Secretary Janet Napolitano (April
14, 2009), available at http://www.yallpolitics.com/images/ThompsonLetter041609.pdf.
82 See Ginger Thompson, Extremist Report Draws Criticism; Prompts Apology, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 16, 2009, 3:03 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/extremist-reportdraws-criticism-prompts-apology/?_r=0.
83 See FY2010 Budget for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland
Security: Hearing Before the H. Homeland Sec. Subcomm. Intelligence, Information Sharing and
Terrorism Risk Assessment, 111th Cong. 12 (2009) (statement of Bart Johnson, Acting Under
Secretary) (“To strengthen our existing processes, an interim clearance process was put in place
shortly after the release of the April 7, 2009 assessment. That process established mandatory
review and concurrence by four offices—Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, the Privacy Office, Office
of the General Counsel, and I&A’s Intelligence Oversight Section. Any non-concurrence that
could not be resolved was elevated to the Deputy Secretary for review, ensuring a much more
coordinated review of I&A’s products than had previously been in place.”).
79
80
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clear on that, given that any concerns out of the movement thus far
are local matters: reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on
protests, health and safety issues, etc, all seem to be situational
awareness issues (not domestic terrorism-related) that apply only to
locals dealing with particular protests, and therefore, lack a DHS
nexus for reporting. Given that their only foray into illegal activity, as
a movement, seems to be violating permit rules and clashes with the
police over removals (mostly, but not exclusively, through civil
disobedience tactics), a product would tend to appear as merely
reporting on First Amendment activity. 84

All in all, the e-mails and documents paint a portrait of a large
agency with many people thinking hard—and, I think, appropriately—
about the First Amendment issues. There are no smoking guns of
repressive action or inappropriate monitoring. 85 CRCL seems, from this
evidence, to have played an important out-of-view part, mostly in
educating agency personnel about the suggested non-interventionist
approach, with that education reinforced by the somewhat authoritative
role in intelligence product review the office had accreted after a prior
public contretemps.
B.

Laptop Searches

In February 2008, a Washington Post story profiled a number of
American citizens who claimed their cell phones and laptops had been
searched, copied, and even confiscated by U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) when they were questioned at the border on their
return to the United States from travel abroad. 86 The article’s news hook
was a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit filed the same day by the
Electronic Frontier Foundation and the Asian Law Caucus, seeking CBP
policy documents relating to such border searches. 87 While the issue had
84 E-mail from [redacted] to [redacted], in DHS FOIA DOCUMENT RESPONSE (PART 1), supra
note 67, at 32.
85 Truthout acknowledges this with evident regret, noting: “[T]he public still does not have a
complete picture of what role, if any, the federal government played in dismantling the
nationwide encampments. Unfortunately, about 250 pages of redacted documents released last
week by the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) National Protection and Programs
Directorate (NPPD), in response to Truthout’s 17-month-old Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) request, does not contain any smoking guns that would put to rest that lingering
question.” Jason Leopold, DHS Emails Question Federal Law Enforcement’s Role in Violence at
Occupy Wall Street and Oakland Rallies, TRUTHOUT (Mar. 28 2013), http://www.truth-out.org/
news/item/15389-newly-released-dhs-emails-questions-federal-law-enforcements-role-inviolence-at-ows-rallies-in-oakland-and-new-york.
86 Ellen Nakashima, Clarity Sought on Electronics Searches, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/06/AR2008020604763.html.
87 After the case was filed, CBP provided most of the documents sought; the plaintiffs
continued their challenge seeking additional information, but lost. Asian Law Caucus v. U.S. Dep’t
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already made an appearance in several federal court opinions in
criminal cases, 88 the Post story made a real splash; laptop searches
became newly salient for both civil rights groups and Congress. The
matter was pressed, for example, at a Senate Judiciary subcommittee
hearing titled “Laptop Searches and Other Violations of Privacy Faced
by Americans Returning from Overseas Travel.” 89 Bills were
introduced, 90 reports written, 91 FOIA requests submitted, 92 objections
elaborated, 93 and affirmative lawsuits filed. 94
In the middle of the controversy, DHS released materials on the
extant policy and the prevalence of electronic device border searches.
The released information showed that CBP policy allowed border
officials to search (and copy) the contents of laptops and cell phones of
any traveler—U.S. citizen or foreign national—undergoing border
inspection, with or without suspicion. CBP also released information on
the prevalence of laptop and cell phone searches: such searches occurred
of Homeland Sec., No. C 08-00842 CW, 2008 WL 5047839 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2008) (granting the
government summary judgment).
88 See, e.g., United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 994–95 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 502–03 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Roberts, 274 F.3d 1007, 1010–11 (5th
Cir. 2001); United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999 (C.D. Cal. 2006), rev’d, 533 F.3d 1003,
1005 (9th Cir. 2008).
89 Laptop Searches and Other Violations of Privacy Faced by Americans Returning from
Overseas Travel: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 52 (2008) (statement of Jayson P. Ahern, Deputy Commissioner, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection).
90 See Comprehensive Immigration Reform ASAP Act of 2009, H.R. 4321, 111th Cong.
(2009); Border Security Search Accountability Act of 2009, H.R. 1726, 111th Cong. (2009);
Securing our Borders and our Data Act of 2009, H.R. 239, 111th Cong. (2009); Travelers’ Device
Privacy Protection Act of 2008, H.R. 7118, 110th Cong. (2008); Travelers’ Device Privacy
Protection Act of 2008, S. 3612, 110th Cong. (2008); Border Security Search Accountability Act of
2008, H.R. 6869, 110th Cong. (2008); Securing Our Borders and Our Data Act of 2008, H.R. 6702,
110th Cong. (2008); Electronic Device Privacy Act of 2008, H.R. 6588, 110th Cong. (2008).
91 ASIAN LAW CAUCUS, RETURNING HOME: HOW U.S. GOVERNMENT PRACTICES UNDERMINE
CIVIL RIGHTS AT OUR NATION’S DOORSTEP (2009), available at http://www.advancingjusticealc.org/sites/asian-law-caucus/files/Returning%20Home.pdf; YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL34404, BORDER SEARCHES OF LAPTOP COMPUTERS AND OTHER ELECTRONIC STORAGE DEVICES
3 (2009); MUSLIM ADVOCATES: UNREASONABLE INTRUSIONS: INVESTIGATING THE POLITICS,
FAITH & FINANCES OF AMERICANS RETURNING HOME (2009), available at
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/muslimadvocates/pages/175/attachments/original/13609
62341/Unreasonable_Intrusions_2009.pdf?1360962341. Later advocacy reports included
CONSTITUTION PROJECT, SUSPICIONLESS BORDER SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES: LEGAL AND
PRIVACY CONCERNS WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY’S POLICY (2011), available
at http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/Border_Search_of_Electronic_Devices_0518_2011.pdf.
92 See Letter from Catherine Crump, ACLU Staff Attorney, to Mark Hanson, FOIA Director,
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (June 10, 2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/
freespeech/laptopfoia.pdf.
93 See, e.g., ACLU Seeks Records About Laptop Searches at the Border, ACLU (June 10, 2009),
http://www.aclu.org/free-speech/aclu-seeks-records-about-laptop-searches-border.
94 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Abidor v. Napolitano, No. CV 104059, 2010 WL 3477769 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2010); see also House v. Napolitano, No. 11–10852–
DJC, 2012 WL 1038816 (D. Mass. Mar. 28, 2012) (complaint filed May 13, 2011).
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at a rate of 250 per month in the months of 2008 and 2009 covered by
the disclosure 95: miniscule as a percentage of travelers but still large as a
number. Advocates and Congress were not satisfied by this information
and kept the issue alive into the new administration, asking the new
Secretary to review and revise the policy. On August 27, 2009, DHS
announced new policies for both CBP and U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE). 96 Unlike the old policies, which had only
been made public after substantial dispute, the new policies were
immediately posted on the Department’s website. They were a bit more
constraining than the versions they replaced. In particular, they
included timeframes, banned detention of devices after searches were
complete, required device owners be provided information on appeal
rights, and added supervisory review. They did not, however, add an
individualized suspicion prerequisite for searches. In addition, the
Secretary instructed CRCL to conduct a “Civil Liberties Impact
Assessment” within 120 days, a deadline of December 2009.
Program Review. A “Civil Liberties Impact Assessment” is a report.
The phrase calls to mind the Environmental Impact Assessments
required by the National Environment Policy Act of 1969, 97 and the
Privacy Impact Assessments required by the E-Government Act, 98 but
whereas EIAs and PIAs have become institutionalized, analogues in
other arenas have not. 99 As of August 2009, CRCL had completed just

95 See Laptop Search Analysis, ACLU (Jan. 14, 2010), http://www.aclu.org/national-security/
laptop-search-analysis. I used this table to compute the average: http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/
natsec/laptopsearch/Tab_24_Chart_with_formulas_08182010.xls.
96 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BORDER SEARCH OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES CONTAINING
INFORMATION, (2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/cbp_directive_3340049.pdf; DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BORDER SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES, (2009), available
at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ice_border_search_electronic_devices.pdf.
97 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012).
98 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, M-03-22, GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTING THE PRIVACY
PROVISIONS OF THE E-GOVERNMENT ACT OF 2002 (2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda_m03-22 (“Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) is an
analysis of how information is handled: (i) to ensure handling conforms to applicable legal,
regulatory, and policy requirements regarding privacy, (ii) to determine the risks and effects of
collecting, maintaining and disseminating information in identifiable form in an electronic
information system, and (iii) to examine and evaluate protections and alternative processes for
handling information to mitigate potential privacy risks.”).
99 The idea of a civil liberties impact assessment seems to have made its first appearance in
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, SECURING AMERICA, PROTECTING OUR FREEDOMS AFTER SEPTEMBER
11, 228 (2005) available at http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/kf/Ch13-Civil%
20Liberties.pdf. See also Jonathan H. Marks, 9/11 + 3/11 + 7/7 = ? What Counts in
Counterterrorism, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 559, 609–24 (2006). As Marks points out, a
proposal for a Human Rights Impact Assessment process in public health policy formulation was
made over a decade earlier. Lawrence Gostin & Jonathan Mann, Toward the Development of a
Human Rights Impact Assessment for the Formulation and Evaluation of Public Health Policies, 1
HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 58 (1994).
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four earlier Civil Liberties Impact Assessments. 100 The concept of an
impact assessment is to systematically examine both the risks posed by a
planned or ongoing process, and costs and benefits of potential
strategies for amelioration of those risks. 101 This new electronic device
searching impact assessment, the first started in the new administration,
was not quickly forthcoming. In fact, it was not completed until
December 2011, twenty months later than the Secretary had directed.
And it was not immediately made public; although its completion was
noted in a quarterly report to Congress, 102 even a bare executive
summary was not posted until over a year later, in January 2013. 103 The
to-be-expected FOIA request quickly followed, 104 and in June 2013 DHS
released a full version, albeit with legal analysis redacted. 105
The Impact Assessment—by this time titled a “Civil Rights and
Civil Liberties Impact Assessment”—took the position that suspicionless
laptop searches by border agents did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. In this it lined up with all the Court of Appeals precedent
extant at the time the document was completed. 106 Between completion
and release, the Ninth Circuit held, en banc, that forensic laptop
searches, but not non-forensic searches, had to be justified by
reasonable suspicion. 107 Even though CRCL found no constitutional
violations, the Impact Assessment nonetheless made five
recommendations:


Record a reason for each search. “CBP officers who decide to
conduct a device search generally should record the reason
for the search in a TECS [computer system] field. To be
clear, we are not recommending that officers demonstrate
reasonable suspicion for the device search; rather we
recommend that officers simply record the actual reason

100 See Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Impact Assessments, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
http://www.dhs.gov/civil-rights-civil-liberties-impact-assessments (last visited Aug. 27, 2014).
101 Gostin & Mann, supra note 99, at 61.
102 See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES, QUARTERLY
REPORT TO CONGRESS, THIRD QUARTER, FY2012 (2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/
default/files/publications/crcl-quarterly-report-fy-2012-q3_0.pdf. The report states that the
Impact Assessment was completed in August 2012, id. at 8, but the report, when released, was
dated December 2011.
103 See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES, CIVIL
RIGHTS/CIVIL LIBERTIES IMPACT ASSESSMENT: BORDER SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES
(2013), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/crcl-border-searchimpact-assessment_01-29-13_1.pdf.
104 See FOIA Request Letter from Catherine Crump, ACLU, to Fernando Pineiro, DHS FOIA
Officer (Feb. 8, 2013), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/dhs_border_search_report_
foia.pdf.
105 See DHS FOIA RESPONSE (2013), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/crclborder-search-impact-assessment_06-03-13_1.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2014). I am listed as the
“reviewing official” on the report.
106 See sources cited supra note 88.
107 United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
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they are conducting the search, whatever that reason is. This
recommendation exceeds constitutional requirements, but
should facilitate CBP’s operational supervision and
oversight.”


Explicitly ban race, religion, and ethnicity discrimination in
searches, subject to narrowly tailored exceptions. CRCL
recommended that CBP and ICE should supplement the
Department’s overarching antidiscrimination policy by
“stat[ing] explicitly in policy that it is generally
impermissible for officers to discriminate against travelers—
including by singling them out for specially rigorous
searching—because of their actual or perceived race,
religion, or ethnicity, and that officers may use race, religion,
or ethnicity as a factor in conducting discretionary device
searches only when (a) the search is based on information
(such as a suspect description) specific to an incident,
suspect, or ongoing criminal activity, or (b) limited to
situations in which Component leadership has found such
consideration temporarily necessary based on their
assessment of intelligence information and risk, because
alternatives do not meet security needs.”



Collect data and conduct analysis of racial/ethnic disparate
impact. “CBP should improve monitoring of the distribution
of electronic device searching by race and ethnicity, by
conducting routine analysis to “assess whether travelers of
any particular ethnicity . . . at any port of entry are being
chosen for electronic device searches in substantial
disproportion to that ethnicity’s portion of all travelers
through the port . . . . Data and results should be shared with
CRCL.”



Remedy any detected disparate impact. If analysis suggests
“that electronic device searching in any port has a
substantial unexplained skew towards travelers of one or
more ethnicity, CBP should work with CRCL on developing
appropriate oversight mechanisms. Subsequent steps
generally should include a requirement of supervisory
approval for searches (absent exigent circumstances) or
enhanced training, and may include other responses.”



Improve notice of redress avenues. “CBP should improve the
notice given to travelers subjected to electronic device
searches by updating tear sheets to refer travelers to DHS
TRIP [Travelers Redress Inquiry Program] if they seek
redress.” The assessment noted that TRIP’s intake categories
were correspondingly expanded, to allow complainants to
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reference not just discrimination but also abusive or coercive
screening and free speech/free press violations. 108

CBP, the posted summary noted, had agreed to carry out each
recommendation.
Civil liberties advocates were quite unhappy with the Impact
Assessment. The ACLU, for example, described it as “disappointing”
and its logic as “faulty.” 109 Arguing in favor of a reasonable suspicion
standard for border searches in terms that were not limited to electronic
devices, 110 it summarized: “Even at the border, the Fourth Amendment
requires more than just hunches. It is disappointing that the DHS
watchdog dedicated to protecting our privacy and other civil liberties
does not recognize that.” The blogosphere ridiculed the project of an
internally-conducted impact assessment as illegitimate (“What else
would you expect them to say?”), and commenters questioned the bona
fides of CRCL, describing it as an “Orwellian”111 office that “probably
functions more like an entity tasked with creating and promoting the
legal justification for programs that violate laws or civil liberties.” 112
Lending credibility to the critics’ complaints was the Cotterman
decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, en banc. In
a decision rendered during the writing of the impact assessment, a
Ninth Circuit panel had agreed with the United States in a child
pornography prosecution that no individualized suspicion was
necessary to justify a border inspection laptop search. 113 A few months
after completion of the assessment, however, though long before its
release, the Court of Appeals granted rehearing en banc, 114 and in

108 See FOIA Request Letter from Catherine Crump, ACLU, to Fernando Pineiro, DHS FOIA
Officer (Feb. 8, 2013), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/dhs_border_search_report_
foia.pdf.
109 Brian Hauss, DHS Releases Disappointing Civil Liberties Report on Border Searches of
Laptops and Other Electronics, ACLU (June 5, 2013), http://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-andliberty-immigrants-rights-national-security/dhs-releases-disappointing-civil.
110 The ACLU’s blog post on the topic noted, for example, “To be sure, rummaging around
through people’s personal papers may well turn up the occasional bad guy, but that is not the only
consideration.” Id. Of course, the government’s authority to “rummage[e] around through
people’s personal papers” without any suspicion at all, if that rummaging is during a border
inspection, is established. Id.; see also, e.g., United States v. Seljan, 547 F.3d 993, 1003–04 (9th Cir.
2008) (summarizing cases upholding suspicionless searches of personal papers and effects during
border inspections).
111 Mike Masnick, Homeland Security: Not Searching Your Laptop Doesn’t Benefit Your Civil
Liberties, So We Can Do It, TECHDIRT (Feb. 11, 2013, 8:51 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/
articles/20130208/17415621927/homeland-security-not-searching-your-laptop-doesnt-benefityour-civil-liberties-so-we-can-do-it.shtml.
112 Kevin Gosztola, DHS Finds Suspicionless Border Searches Do Not Violate Americans’ Civil
Liberties, THE DISSENTER (Feb. 8, 2013, 4:14 PM), http://dissenter.firedoglake.com/2013/02/08/
dhs-finds-suspicionless-border-searches-do-not-violate-americans-civil-liberties.
113 United States v. Cotterman, 637 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2011).
114 United States v. Cotterman, 673 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2012) (granting rehearing en banc).
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March 2013, reversed on this point. 115 Forensic searches, the en banc
court held, were far more intrusive than non-forensic examinations of
electronic devices or of, say, luggage: “It is as if a search of a person’s
suitcase could reveal not only what the bag contained on the current
trip, but everything it had ever carried.” 116 Accordingly, such searches
were lawful under the Fourth Amendment only if supported by
individualized “reasonable suspicion.”
CRCL released the very short executive summary without fanfare—
indeed, without any notice or background at all. The same is true for the
FOIA-prompted release of the entire report, months later. Any
announcement would no doubt have emphasized the five
recommendations in the impact assessment, and that each had been
adopted by DHS. In any event, there was essentially no public
discussion of those recommendations; coverage of the release in blogs
and the press was entirely dominated by the civil rights and civil
liberties community’s displeasure with the reasonable suspicion
conclusion. This is true even though those recommendations gave the
advocacy groups a great deal that they had previously sought, which
might have been advantageously celebrated and even built upon in
additional areas. The rule that CBP officers “record the reason” for any
electronic device search went some distance, though not all the way, to a
requirement that there be reasonable suspicion—yet this aspect of the
report got no attention. The recommendation that the DHS Traveler
Redress Inquiry Program complaint form—thousands of which are filed
each year—led to modification of the options travelers can check to
include complaints about allegedly abusive searches and interviews,
allowing previously impossible monitoring of those issues. 117 Even more
striking, the CRCL-recommended articulation of a clear departmental
rule against racial, ethnic, and religious discrimination in border
searching was something that civil rights and civil liberties groups had
sought for years, 118 filling a much-lamented gap in the federal policy on
racialized law enforcement. 119 And they had similarly long proposed
data collection and analysis to monitor the possibility of bias in traveler
115 United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
899 (2014). The en banc court held, however, that the facts available to the searching border
agents were sufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion, and therefore upheld the search.
116 Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 965.
117 See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 18, at 26 (reporting that 10% of
DHS TRIP complaints used those new checkoff boxes).
118 See, e.g., ASIAN LAW CAUCUS, RETURNING HOME, supra note 91, at 29 (“DHS ought to
adopt a rule prohibiting law enforcement decisions based on race, ethnicity, religion, and national
origin while eliminating the blanket exemption for national security and border investigations.”).
119 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., GUIDANCE REGARDING THE USE OF RACE IN
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 9 (2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/
spl/documents/guidance_on_race.pdf (declining to extend federal policy restricting use of race to
border decisions, including searches).
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screening. 120 All this was in the impact assessment’s accepted
recommendations, but either nobody noticed or advocates decided that
they gained more from decrying the reasonable suspicion conclusion
and did not want to muddy their message by praising these other policy
changes.
C.

Border Patrol and Interpretation

On May 14, 2011, Benjamin Roldan Salinas and his girlfriend,
M.N., were harvesting salal in the Olympic National Forest. (Salal is an
attractive groundcover plant; people get permits to pick it in Forest
Service lands, and then resell it to florists. 121) A Forest Service officer
saw the couple from his car and immediately called the Border Patrol;
based on his experience with salal harvesters and their limited English,
the Forest Service officer asked Border Patrol for assistance with
Spanish-language interpretation. He then stopped the car in which the
two were driving and began to ask them questions (in English). When
the Border Patrol car pulled up, both fled on foot. Salinas jumped into
the Sol Duc River and was swept away. 122 Ms. N. was arrested and
charged with an immigration violation; news reports say that she was
released after 10 days. 123 Salinas was found three weeks later, dead, his
body tangled in brush four miles down river. 124
The tragedy of a death increased considerably the focus by
advocacy organizations on the topic, but the issue was far from new.
Advocacy groups had for some time been concerned about Border
Patrol enforcement near the northern border, arguing that it was unduly
aggressive and often discriminatory. They pointed to the fact that the
number of northern Border Patrol agents has skyrocketed, under
120 See, e.g., ASIAN LAW CAUCUS, RETURNING HOME, supra note 91, at 29 (“To allow Congress
and the public to monitor compliance with this rule, DHS should require CBP officers to log the
gender, race, ethnicity, religion, national origin, and nationality, as known or perceived, of each
individual subjected to secondary inspections, searches of electronic devices, or other special
security measures at each port of entry, and to report this information on an annual basis.”). Cf.
RIGHTS WORKING GRP., RACIAL PROFILING AND THE NEED FOR DATA COLLECTION: WHAT DHS
SHOULD COLLECT AND MONITOR (2011), available at http://rightsworkinggroup.org/sites/default/
files/Data%20Collection%20Recommendations%20for%20DHS.PDF
(urging
racial
data
collection in the different context of immigration enforcement, as well).
121 See Salal Permit Sales to Begin at Olympic National Forest, USDA FOREST SERVICE (Aug. 25,
2011), http://www.fs.usda.gov/detail/olympic/news-events/?cid=STELPRDB5327177.
122 The facts in this paragraph are taken from [Redacted] USDA Complaint Final Agency
Decision, FS-11-5171, 28 (Apr. 28, 2012), available at http://www.nwirp.org/Documents/
PressReleases/DecisionOfOASCRUSDAreCivilRightsComplaintREDACTEDforRelease.pdf.
123 See William Yardley, In Far Northwest, A New Border Focus on Latinos, N.Y. TIMES, May
29, 2012, at A1; Lornet Turnbull & Roberto Daza, Climate of Fear Grips Forks Illegal Immigrants,
SEATTLE TIMES (June 26, 2011), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2015435439_
forks27m.html.
124 Turnbull & Daza, supra note 123.
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congressional pressure, since 9/11; 125 notwithstanding the small number
of attempted illegal border crossings to engage those so assigned, the
number of northern border agents in 2012 was over 2000, compared to
about 300 a decade before. 126 These agents spend a good deal of their
time collaborating with local law enforcement, and advocacy
organizations reported that much of this collaboration was initiated as
calls by local law enforcement for language assistance. (All Border Patrol
agents are required to speak functional Spanish. 127) Once Border Patrol
was on the scene, enforcement interviews and often immigration arrests
frequently followed.
Advocacy and community organizations complained that the
practice violated the civil rights of their clients and participants. For
agencies that receive federal financial assistance—which is to say, nearly
every law enforcement agency 128—the argument was founded on Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Among other things, Title VI forbids
national origin discrimination by federally supported organizations; in
the 1974 case of Lau v. Nichols, the Supreme Court held that this ban
covers language discrimination as well. (Indeed, the Court said in Lau,
the challenged implementing regulation’s requirement that recipients
take “affirmative steps to rectify . . . language deficiency” was
permissible under Title VI. Across the government, Title VI regulations
have similar provisions. 129) So the argument is a simple one: the use of
Border Patrol agents as interpreters by federally supported police
departments is inappropriate, because it subjects Spanish-speakers to
law enforcement inquiry and potential immigration consequences not
faced by others, constituting language discrimination and a failure to
provide appropriate language access.

See CHAD C. HADDAL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32562, BORDER SECURITY: THE ROLE OF
U.S. BORDER PATROL 22 (2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/
RL32562.pdf.
126 Just six weeks after 9/11, the USA PATRIOT Act authorized a tripling of Border Patrol
personnel assigned to the northern border, from its 2001 allotment of 340. By 2005, the number
assigned had reached over 1000. Then in 2006, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 5202, 118 Stat. 3638, 3734, required that 20% of the Border
Patrol’s annual increases in manpower be assigned to the northern border. In Fiscal Year 2010
and subsequent years, the number of Border Patrol agents was over 2,200. See UNITED STATES
BORDER PATROL, BORDER PATROL AGENT STAFFING BY FISCAL YEAR (OCT. 1ST THROUGH SEPT.
30TH), available at http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/U.S.%20Border%20Patrol%
20Fiscal%20Year%20Staffing%20Statistics%201992-2013.pdf.
127 See HOME > CAREERS > JOIN CBP > WHICH CBP CAREER IS RIGHT FOR YOU? > BORDER
PATROL AGENT, http://www.cbp.gov/careers/join-cbp/which-cbp-career/border-patrol-agent (last
visited Aug. 27, 2014).
128 For an index to all the recipients of federal financial assistance from the Department of
Justice alone, see OJP GRANT AWARDS, http://grants.ojp.usdoj.gov:85/selector/main (last visited
Aug. 27, 2014).
129 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974).
125

THE
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Outreach and its uses. Just days after Mr. Salinas’s body was found,
a leading advocacy organization highlighted the issue in an e-mail to
CRCL staff, setting out allegations related to two different incidents—
Mr. Salinas was referred to only obliquely. The complaints led to a
meeting between CRCL and Border Patrol in June 2011, “on the topic of
provision of interpretive services and how to avoid having it chill
immigrant calls to police, etc.” 130 Documented in the response to a
FOIA request, the e-mail and an accompanying memo summarizing the
meeting’s resolution state that CBP and CRCL agreed to explore CBP
use of “musters [that is, in-service training] or other relatively low-key
guidance.” CBP was to coordinate with CRCL on “a draft guidance or
muster on the topic of avoiding harm to community
policing/victims/witnesses when providing assistance with language
interpretation.”131 The pressure from advocates and community groups
was noted: “This is becoming a hotter topic by the day, and we really
need to figure out an appropriately robust response.” 132
It is worth noting that under the Title VI theory, the civil rights
violator is not the Border Patrol but rather the agency that calls Border
Patrol. It is the agency that places that phone call that is allegedly
breaching its language access obligations, discriminating against
Spanish speakers; Border Patrol may be facilitating this breach, but it is
not itself discriminating. The result is that CRCL’s jurisdiction over the
Border Patrol interpretation issue was far from exclusive. The
Department of Justice provides financial support for a high percentage
of the nation’s law enforcement agencies, and therefore has Title VI
authority. And the Department of Justice’s civil rights offices (both the
Office of Justice Programs’ Office of Civil Rights, and the Civil Rights
Division’s Federal Coordination and Compliance Section) face a very
different environment than does CRCL with respect to CBP operational
activities. The political and relational realities that make it difficult for
an internal agency office to find another agency office’s conduct
problematic are bound to be lessened in a situation in which the
complained-about conduct is mostly conducted by another agency. I
analyze in Part III the ways in which the potential involvement of a
sister agency value-based ally, such as the Department of Justice, affects
the hand of an office such as CRCL. Here, I will simply note that the

130 See E-mail from Margo Schlanger, DHS Officer for Civil Rights & Civil Liberties, to Ronald
Vitiello, Deputy Chief, Border Patrol (July 28, 2011, 7:57 AM), in 8/22/2012 DHS CRCL FOIA
RESPONSE 86, available at http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/911_
FOIA_Response.pdf.
131 Memorandum from [redacted], Immigration Section Policy Advisor, to Meeting
Participants (July 29, 2011), in 8/22/2012 CRCL FOIA Response 90, supra note 130.
132 See E-mail from Margo Schlanger, supra note 130, at 85–86.
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FOIA’d documents demonstrate that the potential for Justice
Department involvement was clearly in the minds of the actors. 133
Complaint investigation. Immigrant rights advocates took
advantage of the overlapping jurisdictional issue just a few days later; in
July 2011, Ms. N (Mr. Salinas’s girlfriend) filed a complaint, not with
DHS, but with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), of which
the Forest Service is a component. Because Mr. Salinas’s death was after
an encounter with a federal law enforcement agency, Title VI does not
apply —the activity in question was “federally conducted,” in the
language of federal civil rights offices, not “federally supported.” But,
represented by the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, Ms. N.’s
complaint argued that the Forest Service officer’s actions constituted
race and national origin discrimination, in violation of USDA’s
antidiscrimination regulation 134 and Executive Order 13166, which has
since 2000 forbidden federal agencies to discriminate against people
with limited English proficiency. NWIRP’s argument was twofold. First,
just as under Title VI, NWIRP argued that use of Border Patrol as
interpreters was inappropriate, because it subjected Spanish-speakers to
law enforcement inquiry and potential immigration consequences not
faced by others stopped by Forest Service officers. Second, NWIRP
claimed, that use was pretextual, perhaps a cover for hostility towards
Hispanics or perhaps for the arresting Forest Service Officer’s interest in
immigration enforcement, which should not have been his concern. The
complaint included strong evidence on both theories, including an email sent on June 8, 2011, by the Forest Service Officer who was the
subject of the complaint to several individuals complaining that in the
aftermath of the incident, a community member was watching his
house. A Border Patrol Officer on the e-mail chain responded, “[t]he
great thing would be to request translation assistance so that we are able
to sack this guy up.” As the USDA Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Civil Rights later noted, “[t]he implication of this email was that the
practice of requesting interpretation assistance is a guise for initiating an
immigration enforcement action. . . . The tone of this email clearly
implied that this was a standing practice between FSO [the Forest
Service Officer] and BP [Border Patrol].” 135

133 See Memorandum, supra note 131, at 91 (“She and Officer Schlanger also discussed the role
of the Department of Justice (DOJ) in enforcing these laws, and the recently-circulated draft DOJ
Frequently Asked Questions . . . ”).
134 7 C.F.R. § 15d.3(a) (2014) (“No agency, officer, or employee of the USDA shall, on the
grounds of race, color, national origin, religion, sex, sexual orientation, disability, age, marital
status, family/parental status, income derived from a public assistance program, political beliefs,
or gender identity, exclude from participation in, deny the benefits of, or subject to discrimination
any person in the United States under any program or activity conducted by the USDA.”).
135 See USDA Complaint, supra note 122, at 28.
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Complaining to USDA was a savvy piece of advocacy by NWIRP.
USDA’s civil rights office is not just an Office of Goodness—it is
uniquely empowered, among federal civil rights offices. Its operative
regulation was promulgated by the Clinton Administration in 1999 136
just after the Department settled a mammoth fair-lending case to
remedy generations of discrimination against African-American
farmers. 137 That regulation granted the USDA Office of the Assistant
Secretary not just the authority to adjudicate complaints, but also to
make “final determinations . . . as to the corrective actions required to
resolve program complain[ts].” 138 So unlike CRCL, which is authorized
only to make recommendations to the Secretary and DHS offices, and
required then to report to Congress those recommendations and the
agency response, 139 USDA’s civil rights office, led by a Senate-confirmed
Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, has the regulatory authority to
direct other USDA offices what to do. 140 That authority seems not to be
very often asserted (and was not utilized at all in the Bush
administration), but it continues to exist. 141
Over the next months, as the USDA investigation moved along, the
advocacy community worked to bolster its point of view by preparing
two in-depth reports, each combining sympathetic facts, a rights-based
136 See Nondiscrimination in USDA Conducted Programs and Activities, 64 Fed. Reg. 66,709
(Nov. 30, 1999) (amending 7 C.F.R. pt. 15d (1999)); Nondiscrimination in USDA Conducted
Programs and Activities, 63 Fed. Reg. 62,962 (Nov. 10, 1998) (amending 7 C.F.R. pt. 15d (1998));
Nondiscrimination in USDA Conducted Programs and Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,851 (Apr. 23,
1996) (amending 15 C.F.R. pt. 15d (1996)).
137 See Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C. 1999); see also TADLOCK COWAN & JODY
FEDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20430, THE PIGFORD CASES: USDA SETTLEMENT OF
DISCRIMINATION SUITS BY BLACK FARMERS (2012), available at http://nationalaglawcenter.org/
wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/RS20430.pdf.
138 64 Fed. Reg. 66,709, 66,710. The regulation has what looks like two corresponding
scrivener’s errors. It reads: “The Director of the Office of Civil Rights will make final
determinations as to the merits of complaints under this part and as to the corrective actions
required to resolve program complainants. The complaint will be notified of the final
determination on his or her complaint.” Id. (emphasis added). Clearly the two emphasized words
should have been switched; see also 7 C.F.R. § 2.25(a)(13) (authorizing the Assistant Secretary for
Civil Rights to “make final determinations on both the merits and required corrective action” for
program complaints).
139 See 6 U.S.C. § 345 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-1 (2012).
140 I do not mean to take a position on the essentially hypothetical issue whether the Secretary
would be empowered to instruct the Assistant Secretary how to use this regulatory authority. This
is the analogue of the longstanding administrative law argument about the extent of presidential
authority over decisions by executive branch officials. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2250–51 & nn. 8 & 9 (2001) (citing scholarship on both
sides of the question, and taking a position “accept[ing] Congress’s broad power to insulate
administrative activity from the President, but argu[ing] that Congress has left more power in
presidential hands than generally is recognized”).
141 See USDA, CIVIL RIGHTS AT USDA: A BACKGROUNDER ON EFFORTS BY THE OBAMA
ADMINISTRATION,
http://www.usda.gov/documents/USDA%20Civil%20Rights%20
Background.pdf; see also REPORTS OF CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINTS, RESOLUTIONS, AND ACTIONS,
http://www.ascr.usda.gov/reports.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2014).

SCHLANGER.36.1.2 (Do Not Delete)

86

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

10/27/2014 5:17 PM

[Vol. 36:53

frame, and policy argumentation. 142 The issue remained a live one at
DHS, but the guidance mentioned in the memo summarizing the June
2011 meeting did not issue. Indeed, in April 2012, there is evidence that
CRCL at least considered seeking formal legal advice from the DHS
Office of the General Counsel on the issue. 143 In May, nine months after
filing its USDA complaint, NWIRP took another step to increase interagency pressure on DHS, filing another complaint, this time with the
Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security, on
behalf of five new complainants as well as (again) M.N. Each of the
complainants had been stopped by non-immigration law enforcement,
who called Border Patrol to help with interpretation. In each case, the
Border Patrol agent who responded then questioned the complainant
about his or her immigration status; several of them were put into
immigration proceedings as a result. The theory of this complaint was
the same as for the Forest Service complaint, except with a Title VI
jurisdictional hook:
We therefore believe that the interpretation/translation assistance
justification is being used to cover a pattern of discriminatory
enforcement activity that the agents themselves appear to realize is
problematic. Hence, they report that their involvement was as a
result of a request for interpretation assistance. The inescapable
conclusion is that the actual or pretextual use of Border Patrol agents
for interpretation assistance by law enforcement agencies is resulting
in outright discrimination in one of two ways: 1) to the extent that it
is really about language access, it constitutes impermissible
discrimination because the price of such access for a segment of the
LEP population is enduring questioning about citizenship and
immigration status (and detention and deportation for some); or 2)
to the extent that it is simply a pretext in cases where law
enforcement agencies are calling in Border Patrol without
justification, it is of course a different, but no less pernicious, form of
discrimination. In either case, the practice violates civil rights
protections. 144

142 See SARAH CURRY ET AL., THE GROWING HUMAN RIGHTS CRISIS ALONG WASHINGTON’S
NORTHERN BORDER (2012), available at https://www.weareoneamerica.org/sites/weareone
america.org/files/REPORT_northernborder-FINAL.pdf; LISA GRAYBILL, BORDER PATROL
AGENTS AS INTERPRETERS ALONG THE NORTHERN BORDER: UNWISE POLICY, ILLEGAL PRACTICE
(2012), available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/borderpatrolagents
asinterpreters.pdf.
143 See Draft Memorandum from Tamara Kessler for Audrey Anderson, in 8/22/2012 DHS
CRCL FOIA RESPONSE, supra note 130, at 10.
144 Letter from Jorge Barón, Executive Director, Northwestern Immigrant Rights Project,
Elizabeth Hawkins, Attorney, Bean Porter Hawkins PLLC, and Wendy Hernandez, Attorney,
Hernandez Immigration Law, to Eric Holder, Attorney General, and Janet Napolitano, DHS
Secretary 8 (May 1, 2012), available at http://nwirp.org/Documents/PressReleases/ComplaintTo
USDOJandDHSreInterpretationAssistanceFinalRedacted05-01-2012.pdf. See also id. at 2:
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The May 1 complaint sought intervention by the Department of
Justice, whose Civil Rights Division coordinates Title VI and Executive
Order 13166 enforcement across the government, and whose Office of
Justice Programs has the lead role in Title VI enforcement involving law
enforcement agencies that have received funding from the Department
of Justice. The complaint requested two DOJ statements: the first, to
local law enforcement and the second to federal law enforcement, that
use of Border Patrol agents as interpreters violates Title VI and
Executive Order 13166 obligations, respectively. In addition, NWIRP
asked DHS to terminate removal proceedings for anyone facing
immigration consequences as a result of a request for interpretation by
Border Patrol agents.
The USDA Office of the Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights issued
a formal finding against the U.S. Forest Service on May 31, 2012,
declaring, after comprehensive analysis, that Forest Service use of
Border Patrol agents to provide interpretation services constituted
national origin discrimination and also that the language access issue
was being used was a pretext for discrimination against Latinos. Over
the evident opposition of the Forest Service, the Final Agency Decision
closed with an “Order of Relief,” which included an instruction to the
Forest Service to develop a language access plan that relied on neutral
interpreters, not Border Patrol agents. 145 This order went much further
than the hypothetical Border Patrol guidance discussed within DHS
nearly a year before; that was described in the FOIA’d e-mail as
guidance
about
“avoiding
harm
to
community
policing/victims/witnesses when providing assistance with language
interpretation” whereas the USDA order simply banned, altogether,
language assistance coordination with Border Patrol.
This episode highlights, in particular, the cross-agency dynamics
involved in the work of an Office of Goodness. The USDA’s finding of
discrimination was an important victory for the advocacy groups,
ratifying their legal approach to the Border Patrol interpretation issue.
But they still did not have what they really wanted, because the USDA
decision covered only the Forest Service. To cover state and local law
enforcement calls to Border Patrol would require either an authoritative

[A]s the Border Patrol agents are preparing to depart, the WSP trooper thanks them
and has the following exchange with the agents:

145

• WSP Trooper: “Well, I appreciate you coming out.”
• BP Agent: “No problem, give us a call anytime.”
• WSP Trooper: “Oh yeah, well, we like to, we just have to do it in a roundabout
sort of way.”
• BP Agent: “That’s fine, that’s great, we have no problem with that. We
appreciate the calls.”
[Redacted] USDA Complaint Final Agency Decision, supra note 122, at 35.
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ruling by the Department of Justice (governing the obligations of these
federally supported agencies) or a policy change by the Border Patrol. It
took another six months, but on November 21, 2012, CBP promulgated
“Guidance on Providing Language Assistance to Other Law
Enforcement Organizations,” which instructed Border Patrol offices not
to agree to requests from non-DHS law enforcement agencies seeking
“CBP assistance based solely on a need for language translation.”
Instead, “absent any other circumstances, those requests should be
referred” to interpreters. 146 The policy was distributed to relevant
groups—including NWIRP—about two weeks later. 147
Training. Finally, once the policy was announced, CRCL did
outreach to affected local law enforcement agencies, offering them
materials 148 and training about alternatives to their prior reliance on
Border Patrol for language assistance. 149 I surmise that these activities
assisted Border Patrol in its need to preserve good relations with local
law enforcement, in part by improving local capacity but in part by
suggesting that the denial of language assistance was attributable not to
Border Patrol’s own preferences but because of civil rights imperatives.
D.

The NCTC AG Guidelines

On March 22, 2012, the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence announced a major change to federal information sharing
policy. New guidelines replaced rules announced in 2008, and now
permit the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to obtain and
retain large federal governmental datasets that contain mostly nonterrorism information about U.S. citizens for up to five years, in order to
facilitate repeated “pattern-based” computer queries and analysis
designed to identify terrorism information. It is up to each federal
agency from which NCTC requests databases to negotiate terms—
including whether a shorter time frame is appropriate. Previously
NCTC was allowed to hold onto these kinds of datasets only for 180
days—enough time to process the data, but not to simply put it into

146 Memorandum from David V. Aguilar, Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (Nov. 21, 2012), available at http://foiarr.cbp.gov/streamingWord.asp?i=1233.
147 Press Release, Northwest Immigrants Rights Project, Border Patrol Policy Change
Important Victory for Border Communities (Dec. 13, 2013), available at http://www.nwirp.org/
news/viewmediarelease/49.
148 See LEP RESOURCE GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT, DHS CRCL, available at www.dhs.gov/
sites/default/files/publications/lep-resouce-guide-law-enforcement_0.pdf.
149 See CRCL Provides Language Access Technical Assistance to Law Enforcement (February
2013), DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY (Mar. 15, 2013), www.dhs.gov/crcl-provides-language-accesstechnical-assistance-law-enforcement.
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storage on the chance that it might later prove useful. In addition, the
prior permitted uses of pattern analysis were narrower. 150
This all sounds technical but is actually not. As far as public
information indicated, the new guidelines constituted a sea change in
federal governmental surveillance of U.S. residents and citizens. Just
about everything any part of the federal government knows about
anyone is now potentially available for five years of big-data-mining by
federal counterterrorism authorities. (We know now that similar dataingestion and data-mining techniques were being used by other
agencies, too, 151 but that information became public much later, and is
beyond this Article’s purview.) Yet although privacy advocates and
bloggers tried to fan the flames, public response to the NCTC AG
guidelines change was short lived. The New York Times ran a front page
story, devoting some space to the “civil-liberties concerns among
privacy advocates.”152 But those concerns somehow didn’t catch on.
Blog posts like “The National Counterterrorism Center Just Declared
All of Us Domestic Terrorists” 153 got little traction. Civil liberties usually
have a limited constituency, 154 and with so little to gain, politically,
perhaps Democrats in Congress were reluctant to make this an issue on

150 For a defense of the new rules in civil liberties terms, see OFFICE DIR. NAT’L INTELLIGENCE,
CIVIL LIBERTIES & PRIVACY OFFICE, INFORMATION PAPER: DESCRIPTION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES AND
PRIVACY PROTECTIONS INCORPORATED IN THE UPDATED NCTC GUIDELINES (2013), available at
nctc.gov/docs/CLPO_Information_Paper_on_NCTC_AG_Guidelines_-_1-22-13.pdf.
151 See Charlie Savage, Broader Sifting Of Message Data By N.S.A. Is Seen, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8,
2013, at A1; Charlie Savage & David E. Sanger, Senate Panel Presses N.S.A. on Phone Logs, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 1, 2013, at A1; Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data
from Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST (June 6, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-usinternet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04
497_story.html; Barton Gellman, U.S. Surveillance Architecture Includes Collection of Revealing
Internet, Phone Metadata, WASH. POST (June 15, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
investigations/us-surveillance-architecture-includes-collection-of-revealing-internet-phone-meta
data/2013/06/15/e9bf004a-d511-11e2-b05f-3ea3f0e7bb5a_story.html; Ellen Nakashima et al., New
Documents Reveal Parameters of NSA’s Secret Surveillance Programs, WASH. POST (June 20, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/new-documents-reveal-parameters-ofnsas-secret-surveillance-programs/2013/06/20/54248600-d9f7-11e2-a9f2-42ee3912ae0e_
story.html; see also In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, Docket No. 105B(g) 07-01 (U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 2013),
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/105b-g-07-01-rbw-signed-order130715.pdf.
152 Charlie Savage, U.S. Relaxes Limits on Use of Data in Terror Analysis, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23,
2012, at A1.
153 Marcy Wheeler, The National Counterterrorism Center Just Declared All of Us Domestic
Terrorists, EMPTYWHEEL (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.emptywheel.net/2012/03/23/the-nationalcounterterrorism-center-just-declared-all-of-us-domestic-terrorists.
154 See, e.g., AMY B. ZEGART, EYES ON SPIES: CONGRESS AND THE UNITED STATES
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 72–82 (2011) (discussing the low level of “voter attention to the
bureaucratic details of intelligence agencies”, and finding that “intelligence has fewer and weaker
interest groups than almost any other policy area”).
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which they would fight the Administration. 155 (Subsequent revelations
about the NSA have at least temporarily changed this political calculus.)
Working groups. Nine months after the NCTC guidelines were
issued, a story in the Wall Street Journal by investigative reporter Julia
Angwin revealed a much more sustained record of dissent within the
government. Based on both reporting and FOIA’d documents, which
she posted publically, Angwin’s story revealed that CRCL and the DHS
Privacy Office had opposed the eventually adopted changes over the
course of a full year. The documents include staff e-mails starting
February 2011 discussing recommended language, talking points, and
briefing memos. The discussions and work was conducted via a working
group, denominated the “Internal Records Working Group,” 156 or
occasionally “DHS/NCTC Records Working Group.” 157 It evidently
including staff from numerous DHS offices—the Office of Intelligence
& Analysis, Privacy, CRCL, the Office of the General Counsel, the Office
of Policy, and relevant operational components. 158 It seems that the
working group was able to develop one shared DHS set of suggestions
about the NCTC guidelines. 159 But these met with substantial resistance
outside DHS; one e-mail to a senior DHS lawyer from counsel’s office at
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) states: “We
certainly value the input. However, from our review, several of the
comments tend to suggest a potential lack of understanding as to the
overarching intent of the Guidelines. Furthermore, some of the edits
you have proposed would eviscerate the authorities of the DNI and
NCTC.” 160 Staff discussions were then held between staff from DHS,
ODNI, and the Department of Justice, 161 but the results are not
disclosed in the released materials.
Advice. By late spring 2011, the issues were being discussed,
repeatedly, at the agency leadership level rather than only by staff. A
(redacted) May 12, 2011 memo to the Secretary from me, as CRCL’s
head, and from DHS Chief Privacy Officer Mary Ellen Callahan, is titled
155 See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119
HARV. L. REV. 2311 (2006).
156 See, e.g., E-mail from an Intelligence Operations Specialist at the Office of Intelligence &
Analysis to Rebecca Richards and Others (Feb. 29, 2012), in DHS INTERIM RESPONSE 43,
http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/526365-dhs-interim-responsecontent.html#
document/p347/a83505 (last visited Aug. 27, 2014).
157 E-mail from [redacted] to [redacted] (May 12, 2011, 12:52 PM), in DHS INTERIM
RESPONSE, supra note 156, at 148.
158 See E-mail from [redacted] to [redacted] (Feb. 29, 2012, 11:40 AM), in DHS INTERIM
RESPONSE, supra note 156, at 55.
159 Id. See also E-mail from [redacted] to [redacted] (Dec. 9, 2011, 11:08 AM), in DHS INTERIM
RESPONSE, supra note 156, at 439 (proposing “harmonizing CRCL and OGC’s language to
something both offices can get behind”).
160 See, e.g., E-mail from Matthew Kronisch to Mary Ellen Callahan & Margo Schlanger (Mar.
11, 2011, 2:44 PM), in DHS INTERIM RESPONSE, supra note 156, at 47.
161 Id.
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(clunkily, I regret) “How Best to Express the Department’s Privacy and
Civil Liberties-Related Concerns over Draft Guidelines Proposed by the
Office of The Director of National Intelligence and the National
Counterterrorism Center.” 162 Disagreement continued in subsequent
weeks and months. For example, e-mails between a member of the
Secretary’s staff and Callahan note that Callahan “non concurred on
operational examples” evidently included in some document, because,
she explained, “they were complete non sequiturs, non-responsive, and
did not demonstrate the underlying issues.” 163 The Secretary’s
involvement in the discussion is confirmed at several other points, as
well. 164
By this time, the dispute was solidly multi-agency (or, as they say in
the federal intelligence world, “in the interagency”). And although there
is no public documentation confirming the point, Angwin reported that
Nancy Libin, the political appointee head of the Justice Department
Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties—the DOJ’s analogous Office of
Goodness—was likewise counseling against expansion of NCTC bigdata authority. 165 Angwin explained that that the proposed change had
been prompted by the Northwest Flight 253 “underwear bomber,”
Umar Abdulmutallab, who tried but failed to bring down a Detroitbound airplane on Christmas day 2009. Angwin summarized that at
both DOJ and at DHS, privacy and civil liberties officials “argued that
the failure to catch Mr. Abdulmutallab wasn’t caused by the lack of a
suspect—he had already been flagged—but by a failure to investigate
him fully. So amassing more data about innocent people wasn’t
necessarily the right solution.” 166 And the argument did not die: after
months of negotiations between DHS and NCTC, in November 2011
the civil liberties/privacy issues were revived within DHS by the CRCL
and the Privacy Office with a new memo described as likely to set off a
“firestorm.”167 The two offices prepared talking points for the DHS
162 Memo from Margo Schlanger, CRCL Officer, and Mary Ellen Callahan, Chief Privacy
Officer, for Sec’y Janet Napolitano (May 12, 2011), in DHS INTERIM RESPONSE, supra note 156, at
347.
163 E-mail from Mary Ellen Callahan to John Cohen (June 17, 2011, 9:52 AM), in DHS
INTERIM RESPONSE, supra note 156, at 252.
164 See E-mail from [redacted] to [redacted] (June 1, 2011, 2:22 PM), in DHS INTERIM
RESPONSE, supra note 156, at 212 (referencing an “‘information sharing’ S1 meeting” (“S1” means
Secretary)); E-mail from [redacted] to Ken Hunt (July 28, 2011, 9:40 AM), in DHS INTERIM
RESPONSE, supra note 156, at 283 (referencing “another S1 meeting coming up”). Additional
information on the meeting can be found on pp. 255–65.
165 See Julia Angwin, U.S. Terrorism Agency to Tap a Vast Database of Citizens, WALL. ST. J.
(Dec. 13, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873244783045781716230
40640006 (“At the Department of Justice, Chief Privacy Officer Nancy Libin raised concerns
about whether the guidelines could unfairly target innocent people.”).
166 Id.
167 See E-mail from Margo Schlanger to Mary Ellen Callahan (Nov. 9, 2011, 9:01 PM), in DHS
INTERIM RESPONSE, supra note 156, at 447 (“I’m not sure I’m prepared [for] the firestorm we’re
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Deputy Secretary for a March 2012 Deputies Committee 168 meeting at
the White House. The Wall Street Journal reports that Callahan was told
to make her case at that meeting, 169 but to no avail. The new rules were
signed a few days later.
***
The four vignettes above provide the foundation for some more
general thinking about Offices of Goodness. In Part III, I canvass the
tools available to them and how each one works.
III. TOOLS AVAILABLE TO OFFICES OF GOODNESS
Tools available to Offices of Goodness range along several
dimensions: from the less to more coercive; from the less to more
systemic; from the preventive to responsive; and from the internal to
external. The list below is informed by the four controversies just
described. It is worth noting that because DHS is itself such a new
agency, all four controversies come from early in the agency and office
lifespan; office maturation no doubt affects the dynamics and tools in
some ways that merit additional investigation.
A.

Preventive Tools

Offices of Goodness have a variety of processes they can use to try
to prevent or ameliorate agency operations that conflict with Goodness.
Here I analyze four of those methods: inclusion in policy formulation
working groups; clearance; advice; and training and technical assistance.
Each of these tools can be used in a reactive context as well, to attempt
to reduce or respond to a demonstrated problem.

about to create.”); E-mail from Mary Ellen Callahan to Margo Schlanger (Nov. 16, 2011, 4:22
PM), in DHS INTERIM RESPONSE, supra note 156, at 446 (“I don’t know that we are ever going to
get consensus on this from the other signatories, but we have the dep sec instructions.”).
168 The Deputies Committee is the most senior sub-cabinet meeting in the Executive Branch,
bringing together the Deputy Secretaries of the national security agencies. See NATIONAL
SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE 1 [“NSPD-1”], ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL SYSTEM (2001), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-1.htm.
169 See Angwin, supra note 165.
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Inclusion in Working Groups

Like any bureaucratic organizations, federal agencies bring people
together to work on projects. One important way that an Office of
Goodness can represent Goodness is by participating in such a working
group. 170 There are both risks and benefits to this approach. The risk is
erosion of value commitment as the Office of Goodness staff is carried
along by the imperatives of whatever the working group’s project is—a
risk that is particularly strong if a conflict between the project and
Goodness cannot be reconciled with technocratic adjustment or minor
tweaks but rather requires some degree of sacrifice of project efficacy.
The benefit is inclusion of Goodness in group discussions as the project
develops, which can lead to various types of accommodations and
changes. 171 Even if the group discussions end in impasse, full inclusion
of the Office of Goodness staff can (though it need not) mean that the
conflict is highlighted and explained to bureaucratic higher-ups,
enabling those more senior officials to either fight it out or resolve it
some other way. The NCTC AG Guidelines incident described above
provides an example; the working group negotiations described in the
disclosed documents leading to, first, principals-level discussion at DHS
and, eventually a Deputies Committee resolution, albeit one rejecting
the position of DHS’s CRCL and Privacy Office.
2.

Clearance Authority

Bureaucracies produce documents, and a common control device
is a requirement of “coordination” prior to finalization of those
documents. 172 But as Pressman and Wildavsky observed in their classic
study of government policy implementation, “Telling another person to
coordinate . . . does not tell him what to do. He does not know whether
to coerce or bargain, to exert power or secure consent.” 173 A clearance
170 For in-depth analysis of working groups in another agency and another context, see, for
example, McGarity, supra note 29.
171 See, e.g., Dickinson, Military Lawyers, supra note 29, at 18–21 (describing lawyers’
“integration with officers and troops on the battlefield as essential to their ability to inject legal
norms and values into the decision-making process”).
172 See, e.g., HERBERT KAUFMAN, RED TAPE: ITS ORIGINS, USES, AND ABUSES 49 (1977)
(“Increased participation in governmental decisions by external groups is matched by procedures
to make sure that every administrative unit inside the government also contributes its special
knowledge, point of view, and sympathy for its clientele to the final product. One method is
compulsory clearance of pending decisions with every relevant organizational unit whose
jurisdiction touches on the matters under consideration.”).
173 JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN & AARON B. WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION: HOW GREAT
EXPECTATIONS IN WASHINGTON ARE DASHED IN OAKLAND; OR, WHY IT’S AMAZING THAT
FEDERAL PROGRAMS WORK AT ALL, THIS BEING A SAGA OF THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
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requirement is one specific environment for this issue; clearance
requirements can be more or less coercive. On the most coercive end, an
Office of Goodness could have the ability simply to bar promulgation of
a document. Such authority is usually, however, a hallmark of chain-ofcommand superiority—something not available to Offices of Goodness,
as I have described them. While the agency-head can, of course, decline
to issue (or deny permission to issue) a document, one government
office ordinarily cannot authoritatively stop the issuance of a document
by its sibling office. Still, it is possible to give an office assigned a
clearance role something very close to that power, by structuring the
conflict resolution procedure so that it is the operational office that
needs to “appeal” a clearance denial. This is what is described in the
account above about DHS and Occupy. If the DHS Office of Intelligence
& Analysis disagreed with the considered refusal of CRCL, Privacy, or
the DHS Office of the General Counsel to clear an intelligence product,
the burden was on Intelligence & Analysis to persuade the Deputy
Secretary that it should be able to issue the product. This description
suggests what is, analytically, one step lower in terms of coercion: a
clearance process can allow the objecting office a chance to appeal. Least
coercive is a simple coordination requirement, in which the Office of
Goodness is merely offered a chance to attempt to persuade, but no
other authority. Regardless of the impact on the document subjected to
clearance, even the softest of clearance requirements ensures that each
office asked to clear is kept informed of what is going on at other
government offices, which has its own benefits.
3.

Advice

Both working groups and clearance arrangements are ways of
structuring advice given by staff to agency decisionmakers. An
important tool for any Office of Goodness is the opportunity to give
advice even in the absence of such structures. Advice-giving, both in
writing and at meetings, is a key part of the NCTC account above. And
CRCL’s advice to Border Patrol about interpretation issues is part of
that story, too. Advice-giving can operate in several ways. Office of
Goodness advisors can spot or highlight issues that might otherwise be
insufficiently noticed or valued. They can advocate and perhaps
persuade decisionmakers about a particular position. 174 If their advice is
ADMINISTRATION AS TOLD BY TWO SYMPATHETIC OBSERVERS WHO SEEK TO BUILD MORALS ON A
FOUNDATION OF RUINED HOPES 134 (1973).
174 Cf. Ryan Bubb & Patrick L. Warren, Optimal Agency Bias and Regulatory Review, 43 J.
LEGAL STUD. 95 (2014) (exploring situations in which principal may rationally prefer the agent’s
zeal to exceed the principal’s).
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known or discoverable, they can increase the political cost of taking a
contrary position, because the decisionmaker’s choice to overrule their
objection may become public. On the other hand, if Office of Goodness
advice ratifies rather than challenges agency policy, then it can both
reassure decisionmakers and reduce the potential political cost of that
policy, by providing a ready answer to objectors (“We ran this by the
Office of Goodness, and it signed off”). 175 Of course this last point
provides some leverage for the Office to induce alterations in exchange
for ratification. 176
4.

Training and Technical Assistance

Training is often the first response of an organization faced with a
compliance problem. Work about equal employment opportunity
training suggests that several reasons for its preferred status.
Implementation of a training program allows an organization to signal
its Goodness. In addition, because training looks at inputs, not
outcomes, it is easy to measure and success is very attainable. Moreover,
a training remedy for a Goodness problem supports a cognitively
attractive story of ignorance rather than malicious non-compliance.
None of these rationales turn much on efficacy, and indeed, diversity
and anti-harassment training, for example, are very widespread even
though they do not generally seem to promote race or gender
integration in the workplace or reduce the prevalence of workplace
harassment. 177 But the account of the Occupy issue, above, demonstrates
that training works in other ways as well. While moderate amounts of
workplace training are unlikely to produce experts in any complicated
field, training by Office of Goodness staff can alert the trainees about
“warning flags,” so that they know to seek assistance when such an issue
arises. In-house training also exposes the trainees to the office
175 Cf. Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Delegating to Enemies, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 2193
(2012) (analyzing reasons to delegate a decision to a person or entity that does not share the
delegator’s views).
176 Scholars have sketched similar dynamics in discussions of presidential advice-giving by the
Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency
Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1210 (2013) (“Approval from a (partially) independent
gatekeeper of executive legality gives the White House political credibility and legitimacy when
OLC approves, and the price of such credibility and legitimacy is that OLC must also have the
power to disapprove. Relatedly, conditional on OLC already being in place, a public disclosure
that the White House had pressured or bypassed OLC might supply a focal point that would
trigger investigations by legislators or by Inspectors General, or even condemnation by broad
public opinion, at least in a highly salient case.”).
177 See, e.g., Frank Dobbin & Erin L. Kelly, How to Stop Harassment: Professional Construction
of Legal Compliance in Organizations, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1203 (2007); Alexandra Kalev, Frank
Dobbin, & Erin Kelly, Best Practices or Best Guesses? Diversity Management and the Remediation
of Inequality, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 589 (2006).
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performing the training, ratifying that office as expert and respected,
and placing it in the personal networks of those trained. Finally, training
and technical assistance allow an Office of Goodness to offer a service to
another office in its agency, keeping the relationship from being
uniformly conflictual.
B.

Responsive Tools

Additional tools respond to practices already underway that may
conflict with Goodness. Here I treat two methods—program or
operational review, and investigation of individual or systemic
problems.
1.

Program or Operational Review

The laptop search impact assessment described above is a species of
program review. 178 So too is the demographic data analysis adopted as a
result of that review. Program review is a broad genus, covering
examination of all types of policy, policy implementation, and practices.
A few observations follow:
First, it seems likely that the dynamics of these sorts of reviews will
often depend on whether they are deemed special or routine. A review
that is special usually begins with some kind of trigger, which frames the
expectations about the review by suggesting that a problem may well
exist, and therefore makes it less aggressive for the Office of Goodness
to, in the event, find a problem. In addition, special reviews are more
likely to receive a great deal of time, effort, and attention, where such
resources are harder to muster for routine reviews. 179
Second, the public or non-public nature of a review is important,
but the effects of the choice are complicated. If a review is public, it

178 On impact assessments in particular, see, e.g., KAUFMAN, RED TAPE, supra note 172, at 49;
SERGE TAYLOR, MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK: THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
STRATEGY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM (1984); Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking,
supra note 6. On internal program reviews (or evaluations) that serve general conceptions of
effectiveness, see, e.g., RICHARD C. SONNICHSEN, HIGH IMPACT INTERNAL EVALUATION: A
PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO EVALUATING AND CONSULTING INSIDE ORGANIZATIONS (1999)
(generalizing from author’s FBI experience); Richard C. Sonnichsen, Advocacy Evaluation: A
Strategy for Organizational Improvement, 10 SCI. COMM. 243 (1989) (describing “advocacy
evaluation” inside the FBI).
179 Cf. RICHARD E. MORGAN, DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE: MONITORING DISSENT IN AMERICA
152 (1980) (“In the immediate aftermath of the intelligence scandals, anyone in the Justice
Department assigned the task of reviewing an FBI domestic intelligence investigation will
naturally take it seriously. But inevitably, if the task is an additional duty for those who must
undertake it, it may become devalued to a quick look and a routine ‘sign off.’”).
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functions as “a threat and a means for inviting external oversight.”180
That means that the Office of Goodness is bound to receive much more
pressure from other agency offices to make the review relatively gentle—
but the office whose program is under review is also under much more
pressure to accede to recommendations. As Mark Moore and Jane Gates
wrote about Inspectors General,
[I]t . . . seems clear that the effectiveness of IGs is greatest when they
can operate with the implicit threat of publicity and congressional
attention rather than its reality. When an issue escalates, there is a
real risk that program managers will dig in their heels, frustrating
implementation of proposed changes. 181

Inspectors General have final authority over their reports, which allows
this threat to be a realistic one. A crucial question arises whether the
Office of Goodness has the authority to override suggestions as to the
content of a report that is public, or whether, instead, the report itself is
subject to some kind of fairly coercive clearance process. 182 If there is a
coercive clearance process for a public report, one can expect that
process to exert potentially irresistible pressure to soften its content. As
for a non-public report, unless (like the USDA civil rights office) an
Office of Goodness has final or near-final authority not just to make
recommendations but to insist that they be carried out, a non-public
report may be plainer spoken but is likely to be at least somewhat less
influential. Without anticipated public exposure of at least some
summary of findings and recommendations, there is less reason for
disagreeing operational offices to accede to a program review’s
recommendations. At that point, the Office of Goodness’s goal has to be
to persuade an authoritative decisionmaker, such as the agency’s
Secretary, to resolve an intraorganizational dispute in its favor—an
unattractive position to put the Secretary in, and in any event, one that
requires the Office of Goodness to make a large expenditure of
organizational capital.
Third, unless an Office of Goodness possesses sufficient influence
that it need not care about maintaining collegial relations within its
agency, a program review is likely to be perceived as much more
legitimate if it is undertaken at the request of some important
stakeholder or principal (Congress or the Secretary, for example), or
based on some objective feature of the situation (say, a death). Of course
an Office of Goodness can affirmatively seek an assignment by an
Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking, supra note 6, at 98.
MOORE & GATES, supra note 6, at 73.
182 See, e.g., Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking, supra note 6, at 98 (“[D]uring her
tenure Kelly successfully prevented DHS or the White House from exercising editorial control
over reports issued by her office or privacy impact assessments, although her annual report did go
through a review.”); see also infra note 196 and accompanying text.
180
181
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agency principal to conduct a review, if its leaders believe such a review
would prove useful. But without that assignment—which is to say,
without acknowledgement of a potential problem by an authority
outside the Office—assertion of autonomy to review extant operational
policies or practices is likely to be seen internally as at least powergrabbing and possibly illegitimate.
2.

Complaint Investigation

What makes an investigation different from a program review is
that investigations look (at least initially) at particular facts and results,
examining the effects of some program, activity, or conduct on an
individual or individuals. The description above of the Border Patrol
interpretation issue illustrates the dynamics of an Office of Goodness
investigation, performed by USDA’s highly empowered civil rights
office.
Many offices within government agencies do internal
investigations. To name just a few, Inspector Generals’ offices explore
the possibility of criminal charges being brought; 183 ethics offices and
offices of professional responsibility consider the possibility of various
types of professional discipline; security offices investigate security
breaches. The purpose of an Office of Goodness complaint system is
often more prospective. As Kaufman wrote about ombudsman’s offices,
[i]f the ombudsman finds merit in a complaint, the expectation is
that the accused agency will normally accede to his finding and
redress the grievance as he recommends . . . . The complainant, in
short, would enjoy the services of a well-equipped champion whose
resources would be comparable to those of other parts of the
bureaucracy, a champion whose performance was measured by
triumphs over bureaucratic adversaries. 184

At DHS, because CRCL lacks authority either to prosecute or to
discipline, individual wrongdoing is largely left to those other offices
that have such authority. (Other Offices of Goodness in other agencies
may possess the authority to investigate and sanction. 185) And because
CRCL mostly lacks authority to provide individual remedies, that too, is
left to different systems. 186 Instead, CRCL uses complaint investigations
as a foundation for the same sorts of more systematic recommendations
IGs offices do many other types of reviews as well. See sources cited supra note 32.
KAUFMAN, RED TAPE, supra note 172, at 95–96.
185 See Dickinson, Military Lawyers, supra note 29, at 24–25.
186 For example, administrative claims may be brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Note that CRCL’s authority is broader for disability rights complaints brought under Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See 6 C.F.R. pt. 15.
183
184
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that might come out of a program review. 187 This is evidently similar to
the approach taken by USDA’s civil rights office to its Border Patrol
interpretation investigation, described above.
Why have Offices of Goodness investigations, then? Several
reasons seem important. Investigation authority means that an Office of
Goodness can conduct a targeted program review without being accused
of self-aggrandizement—the agenda is set by complaints, not by the
Office itself. In addition, becoming a regular recipient of complaints
opens a window for the Office into agency operations and their impacts.
This is particularly true if the complaint process is constructed to
facilitate tracking of large numbers of complaints. (Recall that one of the
recommendations adopted as a result of CRCL’s Electronic Device
Searching Impact Assessment was modification of the check-off options
for traveler complaints, to include complaints about allegedly abusive
searches and interviews, allowing much easier monitoring of the issue
over time.) And correspondingly, authority to conduct investigations
premised on complaints allows an Office of Goodness to offer a service
to the external advocacy and community groups whose support I argue
in Part IV it needs to maintain effectiveness.
Whatever type of investigation or review is available to it, it does
seem that an Office of Goodness needs some way to get beyond the
information affirmatively provided by other agency offices: de facto or
de jure inability to demand a response to questions and production of
documents would considerably shrink the Office’s abilities. 188
C.

Boundary-Spanning Tools

I have mentioned several times above the interaction between an
Office of Goodness and those outside its agency who share a
commitment to its assigned value, Goodness. The relationship between
the office and those external constituencies requires care and feeding.
The tools discussed here are outreach, document generation, and
congressional reporting.
187 See FY 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 18; DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2010 (2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/crcl-annual-report-fy-2010.pdf; DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2009 (2010), available at http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/crcl-annual-report-fy-2009.pdf.
188 See Mary Ellen Callahan, For Federal Privacy Programs, the Final Fair Information Practice
Principle Is Crucial, PRIVACY PERSPECTIVES (Aug. 28, 2013), https://privacyassociation.org/news/
a/for-federal-privacy-programs-the-final-fair-information-practice-principle (“The lack of
investigatory or enforcement authority among other federal Chief Privacy Officers diminishes
their ability to address thorny privacy policy issues and violations. The incentives to admit fault or
face consequences are shifted, and the privacy officers cannot force a response or production of
documents.”).
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Outreach

A crucial aspect of Office of Goodness operations is boundary
spanning 189—maintaining connections to external constituencies of
Goodness. Each Office of Goodness offers an obvious organizational
entry point to stakeholders that share its assigned value. As discussed in
the next section, secure connections are also vital to maintaining the
Office’s commitment to its assigned value. But even apart from that,
where these connections are secure and effective, they offer the Office of
Goodness information about problems, ideas about solutions, political
support in the Congress, and public back-up for contested positions
taken inside the agency. The “groups,” as non-profit advocacy
organizations are sometimes called in Washington, can do many things
not easily available to a government office, from talking to the press, to
pressing an issue with a sympathetic congressional staffer, to an
organized protest. It is obviously better for an Office of Goodness if such
moves are supportive, rather than adverse to its own existence and its
preferred outcomes. In addition, one of the Office’s claims to influence
within an agency is its ability to predict what steps will and will not
provoke controversy from groups that share its value.
So all things point Offices of Goodness towards robust engagement
with organizations dedicated to Goodness, by meeting and other
methods. The Border Patrol interpretation section, above, demonstrates
some of the dynamics, as the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project and
others reached out to CRCL, and CRCL reported these groups’ concerns
to Border Patrol and named those concerns as one reason to issue new
policy.
2.

Document Generation

Each Office of Goodness strategy produces documents, which may
set out a problem, finding, or solution. Those documents are a key part
of Office output. 190 They may be disclosed automatically or on request

189 On the role and stresses of boundary-spanners in complex organizations, see, for example,
W. RICHARD SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL, AND OPEN SYSTEMS 203–13 (5th ed.
2003); Howard Aldrich & Diane Herker, Boundary Spanning Roles and Organization Structure, 2
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 217 (1977); Howard Aldrich, Organizational Boundaries and Interorganizational Relations, 24 HUM. REL. 279 (1971); Robert E. Spekman, Influence and
Information: An Exploratory Investigation of the Boundary Role Person’s Basis of Power, 22 ACAD.
MGMT. J. 104 (1979).
190 Cf. Daniel E. Walters, Litigation-Fostered Bureaucratic Autonomy: Administrative Law
Against Political Control, 28 J.L. & POL. 129 (2013).
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by, say, Congress, or under FOIA. 191 Or, theoretically, 192 they could be
leaked. However they get out, they are fodder for external organizations
and constituencies—particularly when the documentation supports
those organizations’ views. For example, the documentation of CRCL’s
nonconcurrence with the release of the Right-Wing Extremism paper
bolstered the views of external organizations and stakeholders that the
paper was problematic. And it provided them with a talking point (“An
office inside DHS agrees that . . . ”). Even if an Office’s conclusions do
not accord with the external users’ views, if the Office does a competent
job gathering and analyzing the situation, the resulting information can
be highly useful to external actors, contributing to what Seth Kreimer
names the “ecology of transparency.” 193
3.

Congressional Reporting

As described in Part I’s discussion of CRCL’s statutory authorities,
Congress typically requires Offices of Goodness to include in their
annual or other congressional reports information that is either of
interest to members of Congress or to their constituencies. Indeed, it
would be odd for Congress to omit such a requirement, which allows
Offices of Goodness to improve congressional oversight capacity.
Placing a monitor inside the agency and instructing that monitor to
report back in the event of a problem is a variant of the “fire-alarm”
oversight strategy named (and analyzed most famously) by political
scientists Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz. 194 The strategy
has pros and cons, from Congress’s perspective. An Office of Goodness
has internal access, which improves the penetration of the fire-alarm
system beyond what can be expected of, say, an advocacy organization.
On the other hand, an Office of Goodness is subject to much more
pressure than one of the outside advocacy groups to minimize or fail to
report its colleagues’ problems. 195 In addition, congressional reporting
depends on the Office maintaining at least sufficient influence to both
191 For a discussion of the development of FOIA as an accountability tool after the 9/11
attacks, see GOLDSMITH, supra note 22, at 112–21; Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom of Information
Act and the Ecology of Transparency, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1011 (2008).
192 I am not aware of any leaks from CRCL, but of course it’s possible.
193 See Kreimer, supra note 191.
194 See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police
Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984).
195 Perhaps this is why some of the Intelligence Community’s Civil Liberties Offices issue
congressional reports so opaque as to be useless as fire alarms. See, e.g., DEP’T OF DEF. PRIVACY &
CIVIL LIBERTIES OFFICE, REPORT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2013, OCTOBER 1, 2012 THROUGH
DECEMBER 31, 2012, at 2 (2013), available at http://dpclo.defense.gov/Portals/49/Documents/
Privacy/FY13QTR1.pdf (listing number of complaints by relevant constitutional amendment, and
reporting only that some are pending, and some have been reviewed).
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find out about problems, and at least sufficient autonomy or authority
to report about them. Occasionally a bureaucratic arm-wrestle breaks
out over precisely this issue, when an Office wishes to report more
candidly than its agency would prefer. One episode at DHS involving
the Privacy Office led to the enactment of two statutes purporting to
forbid DHS or OMB editing of that office’s annual report, a result OLC
opined was unconstitutional; DHS informed Congress it would not be
enforcing the statute. 196 But even in less contentious situations, Offices
interested in having an impact are well advised to see congressional
reporting not just as a chore but an opportunity for influence. 197
The prior paragraph deals with the impact of congressional
reporting after the fact. But congressional reporting requirements have
dynamic effects, too. If Congress requires an Office of Goodness to
publish both its recommendations and its agency’s response to them,
that simultaneously magnifies pressure on both the agency and on the
Office, particularly if congressional committees or staff are believed to
monitor the reports, and potentially follow up with letters, requests for
briefings, or hearings. Public disclosure and the possibility the agency
might be called to account increases the stature of the Office’s
recommendations and the likelihood of concurrence. But it also
imposes pressure on the Office to soft pedal and thereby keep
disagreements in the family. The point is that congressional reporting is
double edged in just the same way described above with respect to
program reviews.
***
The tools just described—and the list might be supplemented
somewhat based on other case studies—can only affect what occurs
within an Office of Goodness’s agency if others in that agency care
about the Office’s views and if those views are sometimes different from
196 In 2007, Congress mandated in its annual appropriations bill that that no appropriated
funds be used by anyone outside the Privacy Office to alter or delay the Office’s annual
congressional report. Similar restrictions were included in the Implementing Recommendations
of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, supra note 42, at § 802(e)(1) (DHS’s Chief Privacy Officer
shall “submit reports directly to the Congress . . . without any prior comment or amendment by
the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, or any other officer or employee of the Department or the Office
of Management and Budget.” For the OLC opinion rejecting this statutory provision as
unconstitutional, see STEVEN G. BRADBURY, CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DIRECT REPORTING
REQUIREMENT IN SECTION 802(E)(1) OF THE IMPLEMENTING RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 9/11
COMMISSION ACT OF 2007 (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2008/privacy-officerreport.pdf.
197 See Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking, supra note 6, at 97–98 (describing the
DHS privacy office: “Kelly framed her office’s direct-congressional-reporting function as both a
right and an obligation, and emphasized the function’s importance as a signal of structural
independence”).
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those of other agency staff. These prerequisites for Office of Goodness
effectiveness are the subject of the next part.
IV. WHAT DO OFFICES OF GOODNESS NEED?
Offices of Goodness cannot increase the amount of Goodness in an
agency without two capacities: influence and commitment. That is,
Office staff must know about and be able to affect agency activity, and
they must wield such influence as they have in furtherance of Goodness,
their Office’s assigned value. In this part, I argue that both influence and
commitment depend crucially on external reinforcement. 198 It is this
dependence that protects the Office of Goodness strategy from a charge
of insularity and self-serving self-regulation.
The argument begins with the observation that Offices of
Goodness exist to bring into their agencies not just a value that is not
primary, but one that constrains or even conflicts with the agency’s
raison d’etre. For reasons to do with culture, expertise, interest groups,
and congressional oversight, agencies tend to develop a strong and
univalent sense of mission. As James Q. Wilson wrote in his classic
treatment of bureaucracy:
A sense of mission becomes the basis, explicitly or implicitly, on
which personnel are recruited, trained, rewarded, and managed.
Philip Selznick, from whom my views on this matter are so obviously
derived, has remarked that an organizational mission is not simply
the formal goal of the organization but the distinctive and valued set
of behaviors, selected from among a large number of behaviors, by
which activity toward a goal and organizational maintenance are
reconciled. Mission, in short, implies much more than the neutral,
technical term, “means.” 199

198 The account I present is consonant with Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan,
Privacy on the Books and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247 (2011) (describing how factors
including the increasing influence of privacy advocates and the rise of privacy professionals have
pushed corporate privacy regimes from the procedural to the substantive), and TAYLOR, supra
note 178 (highlighting as crucial factors for the success of an internal compliance unit the clarity
of its goals, its staff’s commitment to those goals, its autonomy, and its external support). Todd
LaPorte’s work on “high-reliability organizations” provides another useful analogy. See, e.g., Todd
R. La Porte, Challenges of Assuring High Reliability When Facing Suicidal Terrorism, in SEEDS OF
DISASTER, ROOTS OF RESPONSE: HOW PRIVATE ACTION CAN REDUCE PUBLIC VULNERABILITY 99
(Auerswald et al. eds., 2006) (“Highly reliable operations . . . . are difficult to sustain in the absence
of external enforcement. Continuous attention both to achieving organizational missions and to
avoiding serious failures also requires repeated interactions with elements in the external
environment, not only to ensure resources, but, as importantly, to buttress management resolve
to maintain the internal relations outlined above and to nurture highly reliable organizations’
culture of reliability.”).
199 JAMES Q. WILSON, THE INVESTIGATORS: MANAGING FBI AND NARCOTICS AGENTS 14
(1978). Among Selznick’s relevant work is, for example, SELZNICK, supra note 1, at ch. 3.
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Scholars of bureaucracy and administration have long explained
that agencies have difficulty simultaneously internalizing a mission and
its constraints, much less conflicting goals. 200 Since the entire point of an
Office of Goodness is constraint or opposition, this means that every
Office of Goodness faces continual pressure to slide into disempowered
irrelevance or to be tamed by capture or assimilation. 201 These dangers
are magnified by the fact that a powerless Office of Goodness is far from
useless either to its agency or to Congress. Even if everyone inside the
agency knows that the Office has little or no influence, both the agency
and the Congress can continue to reap some of the benefits of its
existence, by claiming, technically accurately, to have an Office
dedicated to Goodness. Stakeholders, whether in or out of the agency,
who are less interested in the value Goodness than in seeming to care
about Goodness may be well served by a neutered Office, to which
assignments can be made without fear of disruption. 202 And
stakeholders who care more may not be able to detect the Office’s
fettered circumstances. On the other hand, if an Office truly lacks all
influence, that fact is bound to get out to some extent, making it an
unconvincing standard-bearer and therefore fairly useless. So one would
expect Offices of Goodness to face efforts to limit but not quite
eliminate their influence. I argue in this Part that Offices will be hard
pressed to resist such efforts without external reinforcement and
support.
Even a powerless Office of Goodness poses some risk to its agency;
without much influence itself, it may, for example, nonetheless produce
records able to be used against the agency by more muscular Goodness
advocates. This prospect can be eliminated by capture or assimilation, 203
200 See, e.g., JEANNE NIENABER CLARKE & DANIEL C. MCCOOL, STAKING OUT THE TERRAIN:
POWER AND PERFORMANCE AMONG NATURAL RESOURCE AGENCIES (2d ed. 1996); WILSON,
BUREAUCRACY, supra note 6; Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the
Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2009); J.R. DeShazo & Jody
Freeman, Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2217 (2005).
201 Offices of Goodness may be unwelcome within agencies for other reasons as well. As
Kaufman wrote, an ombudsman’s office—a species of Office of Goodness—“creates anxieties
among legislators and administrative agencies already on the scene . . . . Administrative agencies
wonder what the impact of an ombudsman on their operations would be, particularly since he
would introduce impediments to crisp decisive action, and perhaps encourage resistance where
none would otherwise develop.” KAUFMAN, RED TAPE, supra note 172, at 96.
202 See, e.g., JOHN W. MEYER & W. RICHARD SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS:
RITUAL AND RATIONALITY 31 (updated ed., 1991) (“By designing a formal structure that adheres
to the prescriptions of myths in the institutional environment, an organization demonstrates that
it is acting on collectively valued purposes in a proper and adequate manner.”).
203 Ordinarily, the phrase “regulatory capture” denotes “a situation in which an industry which
is regulated controls a regulatory agency’s policies.” Michael E. Levine, Regulatory Capture, in 3
THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 267, 267 (Peter Newman ed.,
1998). In our setting, however, the agency itself is in a role like a regulated entity, and the Office of
Goodness is akin to a regulator. For a summary of capture theory, see id.; Michael E. Levine &
Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a

SCHLANGER.36.1.2 (Do Not Delete)

2014]

10/27/2014 5:17 PM

O F F I C E S O F GO O D N E S S

105

which I mean to encompass not just personally self-interested behavior,
but any systematic inclination by Office of Goodness staff to undervalue
Goodness compared to the agency’s primary mission. (As discussed
below, the mechanisms of capture may be quite different than in the
ordinary usage in positive political theory.) Pressures towards capture or
assimilation are likely to be even stronger than those towards
impotence. After all, unlike a disempowered Office, a tame Office of
Goodness can be given the trappings of influence without threat to the
agency. 204 Again, this part’s argument is that resistance to capture can be
bolstered by a variety of boundary-spanning techniques, to ensure that
Office staff maintain external Goodness advocates as an important
reference group.
A.

Influence

An Office of Goodness cannot be effective if its staff is frozen out of
meetings, its advice can be disregarded without consequence, or its
activities face resource constraints that prevent it from undertaking or
participating in important projects. Offices of Goodness do not seek
autonomy (as so many other federal offices do), but they must seek
influence. As in so many situations in federal agencies, “[t]he principal
source of power is a constituency.” 205 And of course Offices are not the
passive recipients of constituency support; they can help build support,
as well as rely on it. 206 In addition, Offices of Goodness can gain
influence from threat, rather than support. As Sallyanne Payton once
wrote about the analogous context of company doctors,
external threat can turn an in-house staff professional from a cost
center into a ‘boundary person’ who is worth the price of the threats
averted. The question is how to convert the company doctor’s
legitimate ethical concerns into demands made on the company by

Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167 (1990). For foundational treatments, see, for example, Sam
Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); Richard
Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335 (1974); George J.
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971).
204 On the analogous issue of “cosmetic compliance” in the corporate law context, see, e.g.,
Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH.
U. L.Q. 487 (2003).
205 WILSON, BUREAUCRACY, supra note 6, at 204.
206 Many sources analyze the ways in which federal offices build their varied constituencies.
See, e.g., CARPENTER, BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY, supra note 15; CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND
POWER, supra note 15; KAUFMAN, THE FOREST RANGER, supra note 15; WILSON, THE
INVESTIGATORS, supra note 199; Cuéllar, supra note 15.
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powerful outsiders, thereby allowing company doctors
demonstrate their loyalty by helping their companies comply. 207

to

The important outsiders for federal Offices of Goodness, both in terms
of support and threat, are Congress, non-governmental groups, other
agencies, and the White House. Observations on many of the relevant
dynamics follow:
Congress, the White House, and the budget. Without sufficient
resources, the Office will, for example, lack staff. And the tools described
above can be quite staff intensive. 208 Budgetary needs require support to
satisfy. Like nearly all federal agencies, an Office of Goodness depends
on the Congress for its budget. And Congress—or at least the members
of Congress in the President’s party—begin with the administration’s
budget, submitted by the Office of Management and Budget, within the
White House. Thus the Office needs support from at least one of the key
budgetary players—the agency’s budget decisionmaker (who provides a
proposed budget to OMB), the White House, or someone in the
Congress. Others have explored the federal budgetary process in
detail, 209 and I will not belabor the point, except to observe that an
administration’s budgetary requests for Offices of Goodness might well
require particular scrutiny by the Office’s supporters; various parts of
the administration might want to starve particular Offices, if they can,
given the Offices’ watchdog function. 210
Congress and the oversight function. Perhaps less obvious (though
partially broached above) is Congress’s nonbudgetary role in buttressing
the influence of Offices of Goodness. As already explained,
207 Sallyanne Payton, The Company Doctor, by Elaine Draper, 23 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT.
384, 386–87 (2004) (book review).
208 When DHS’s CRCL took on the new task of intelligence product clearance, the
Administration’s FY 2011 proposed budget sought an additional six staff positions to do the work,
at a cost of $1.2 million. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION,
FY 2011, at OSEM-23, available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs_congressional_
budget_justification_fy2011.pdf. This was about 5% of the office’s total budget. The funds were
not, however, forthcoming. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
JUSTIFICATION, FY 2012, at OSEM-21, available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhscongressional-budget-justification-fy2012.pdf.
209 The current executive budget process is set out in very great detail in OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR NO. A-11, PREPARATION, SUBMISSION, AND
EXECUTION OF THE BUDGET (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
omb/assets/a11_current_year/a11_2013.pdf. For some discussion of the constraints inherent in
this process, see Datla & Revesz, supra note 31, at 805–808 (2013). More generally, see, e.g., ALLEN
SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS (1995); AARON WILDAVSKY, THE
NEW POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS (1988); Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the Structures of
Decisionmaking in the Federal Budget Process, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 387 (1998).
210 As Richard Pious writes of sub-agency operational bureaus seeking more autonomy, they
work to ensure that “[d]etailed spending authorizations and specific itemized appropriations [are]
granted directly to the bureaus in order to prevent the department (or White House) from
determining the allocation of resources for bureau programs.” RICHARD M. PIOUS, THE
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 232 (1979).
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congressional reporting is one way Offices of Goodness carry out their
fire alarm function, alerting Congress to issues members interested in
Goodness might want to know about. Congressional reporting is
simultaneously a key tool within the agency, because exposure of an
Office’s recommendations and the agency’s responses pressures the
agency to agree to the recommendations (while simultaneously
pressuring the Office to tone those recommendations down, so that the
agency’s leaders don’t mind saying yes). The additional point here is
that congressional reporting’s influence is likely to fade if congressional
committees, members, or staff do not follow up on at least some of what
is revealed, whether the follow-up occurs by letter, requests for staff or
member briefings, committee hearings, or any other of the myriad ways
in which congressional actors make their views and interests known. 211
White House. The White House has many non-budgetary levers
that influence what goes on in the agencies. Of course this is true for the
President and those very close to him. As then-professor Elena Kagan
summarized in her analysis of “Presidential Administration,”
[A] President has many resources at hand to influence the scope and
content of administrative action. Agency officials may accede to his
preferences because they feel a sense of personal loyalty and
commitment to him; because they desire his assistance in budgetary,
legislative, and appointments matters; or in extreme cases because
they respect and fear his removal power. 212

But, like every other institution in this Article (and with credit for
the phrase to Ken Shepsle), the White House is a “they,” not an it. 213 For
any Office of Goodness, at least dozens of the many hundreds of staff in
the Executive Office of the President 214 can either support or diminish
the Office’s influence. White House staff—assigned to the White House
Counsel’s office, Domestic Policy Council, the National Security Staff,
the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, the Office of Public
211 See, e.g., JOEL D. AUERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT (1990); LAWRENCE C. DODD & RICHARD L. SCHOTT, CONGRESS AND THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1979); McCubbins & Schwartz, Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, supra
note 194.
212 Kagan, Presidential Administration, supra note 140, at 2298.
213 Cf. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron,
12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992). The point is frequently made (though also frequently
ignored). See, e.g., Magill & Vermeule, Allocating Power, supra note 14, at 1036 (“Agencies Are a
‘They,’ Not an ‘It.’ Even casual observers of the administrative state recognize that agencies, like
nearly all large organizations, are not unitary actors.”); Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1854 (2013) (“Recall that
while the President is ultimately in charge, the White House itself is emphatically a ‘they,’ not an
‘it.’”).
214 See Leadership Library, Executive Office of the President (subscription site,
http://lo.bvdep.com/OrgDocument.asp?OrgId=-1&LDIBookId=19&LDIOrgId=151861&LDI
SecId=200&FromRecent=1&Save=0#O151861).
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Engagement, etc.—can function very like congressional staff after a “fire
alarm” is rung, reaching into the agency with particular vigor if
something or someone directs their attention to a particular problem.
White House staff can request or ignore Office views on the resulting
issues, and can include or exclude Office staff and leadership from the
resulting meetings. Even though agencies strive to present a united front
to the White House, involvement in White House meetings and
discussions is very empowering, validating the importance and
“equities” (a word used in Washington to mean appropriate role) of the
offices included and necessitating at least their grudging acquiescence in
the agency position. If, on the other hand, White House staff excludes or
gives short shrift to the views of Office staff or leadership, that
diminishes Office influence within the agency. 215
Other agencies. Offices of Goodness can be shored up or
undermined by offices in other agencies. As DeShazo and Freeman have
pointed out, “agencies can be prompted to take their secondary missions
more seriously when Congress enhances interagency lobbying by
increasing the power of other agencies, which derive relevant expertise
and interests from their own statutory mandates, to lobby the
implementing agency.” 216 Offices of Goodness are, to use this language,
assigned to a “secondary mission” within their agency. So the kinds of
efforts DeShazo and Freeman describe, in which agencies influence each
other by “providing useful information, threatening litigation, or
threatening to go over the head of the agency to members of Congress
or higher-ups in the White House” 217 all interact with Offices of
Goodness’ efforts. This is obvious in two of the examples, above, dealing
with the Border Patrol interpretation issue and the NCTC data ingestion
and retention guidelines. In the first, the FOIA’d documents evidence
substantial impact from what DeShazo and Freeman might call
“lobbying” of DHS by DOJ and USDA. The result was to push DHS
towards the more civil-rights-friendly policy of restricting Border
Patrol’s interpretive services offered to non-DHS law enforcement. On
the other hand, the DHS position in the NCTC data-retention matter,
which had evidently been agreed to within the Department (including
by CRCL and the Privacy Office), prior to objections by ODNI, was
overruled in the interagency process.

215 Magill & Vermeule, Allocating Power, supra note 14, at 1058, makes a similar point about
the intra-agency boost provided by White House access, though tied to the President rather than
the White House more broadly: “Our hypothesis is that the President has more influence over
[Executive-created] agencies because those who are closest to the President within these agencies
are better equipped to overcome their intra-agency opponents. Their access to the superior
authority of the President will operate as something of a trump card in intra-agency disputes.”
216 See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 200, at 2221.
217 Id. at 2261.
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The point is not simply that another agency might agree or
disagree with an Office of Goodness, although as just seen either is
possible. It is that an Office of Goodness may be able either to call upon
or to fend off a like-minded part of another agency, increasing its own
fire-power in the former instance or bolstering its agency’s (highlyvalued) autonomy in the latter. Agreement is not a prerequisite for
assistance. If, for example, an outside agency understood to be
committed to Goodness takes a harder stance on some issue than an
Office of Goodness, that might actually enhance the Office of
Goodness’s position, making its preferred approach the compromise.
But less happily for the Office of Goodness, the other agency may
undermine it in several ways. If the outside agency takes a softer stance
than the Office of Goodness, that may defeat the Office’s point of view
in the specific instance and harm the Office’s reputation more generally.
Or the outside agency’s harder stance, if it wins the day, may damage the
Office’s influence by rebutting its claim to its agency that following
Office advice will assist in defending against attacks on the agency’s
autonomy. 218
Advocacy Groups. As sociologists have explored, for decades
American corporations have created offices to mirror their regulatory
environment, putting in place environmental, EEO, and labor relations
offices, for example. 219 Offices of Goodness constitute the equivalent
strategy for government agencies, mirroring external stakeholder values
and providing an obvious point of access for advocacy groups interested
in constraining the agency’s operations. So a key role for many Offices
of Goodness is to manage the relationship between the agency and the
advocacy groups that are the agency’s natural opponents, but the
Office’s natural constituents—to take their phone calls and meetings,
answer at least some of their questions, and blunt their criticisms. For
this to work, the Office has to provide the groups with something of
value. 220 That is likely to be information and access, whether via
218 Cf. WILSON, THE INVESTIGATORS, supra note 199, at 165 (“In my view, it is the desire for
autonomy, and not for large budgets, new powers, or additional employees, that is the dominant
motive of public executives.”).
219 See JOHN W. MEYER & W. RICHARD SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS: RITUAL
AND RATIONALITY (1992); J.D. THOMPSON, ORGANIZATIONS IN ACTION: SOCIAL SCIENCE BASES
OF ADMINISTRATIVE THEORY (1967); Paul R. Lawrence & Jay W. Lorsch, Differentiation and
Integration in Complex Organizations, 12 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1 (1967).
220 Of course, leaders in Offices of Goodness may wish to assist advocacy organizations for
simpler ideological reasons, as well, to increase the organizations’ own stature in service of the
shared value. Steve Teles explores this point in his account of “transformative bureaucracy,”
which he describes as activities by political appointees “consciously deploying agency resources to
transform the terms of political competition in the future,” in part by “assist[ing] the development
of [chosen] political organizations by providing them direct subsidy, increasing their profile (for
example, by giving highly-publicized speeches to their members), and by granting them preferred
access to agency decision making.” Steven Teles, Transformative Bureaucracy: Reagan’s Lawyers
and the Dynamics of Political Investment, 23 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 61, 62 (Apr. 2009).
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informational meetings or by producing reports and documents that
advocates can in turn use. Other possibilities include a complaint
process, which might produce individual or policy remedies for
problems, or at the least, serve process values. Advocacy groups hope for
more, of course; what they really want is that that Offices informed by
their concerns and analysis may be able to accomplish sought
reforms. 221 And if the Office is influential, that sometimes happens.
As with each player discussed in this section, advocacy groups can
augment or diminish the influence of an Office of Goodness. Offices of
Goodness often owe their very existence to advocates, 222 and lean
heavily on their support. In part this is because Offices of Goodness are
sharply limited in how open they can be with their would-be-sponsors
in Congress. For example, one administration rule governing the
budgetary process is that in congressional briefings, public meetings,
and the like, all executive branch officials must support the President’s
budget, once it exists. So if an Office of Goodness employee is asked in a
congressional briefing whether the Office needs more money than the
President’s budget provides, the explicit public answer, at least, must be
no. Both the agency and the White House use various methods to
enforce that answer—for example, by sending chaperones to such
meetings. To state the same point more generally, Offices of Goodness
are part of the very agency it is their job to constrain, which means they
must walk a very fine line in discussing their needs, successes, and
recommendations even with outsiders on whom they depend, whether
Congress or the White House. Accordingly, in both budgetary and
policy processes, an Office of Goodness benefits greatly from having a
surrogate or advocate who can speak more plainly. If advocacy groups
find value in the Office of Goodness, they are likely to play that role.
Within the agency, it can actually be quite helpful to the Office if
advocates somewhat outflank it in their zeal for Goodness. That frames
the Office’s own views as moderate, helping it to maintain its internal
credibility. If, however, the divergence between the external Goodness
position and that of the Office is too great—as it seems to have been in
the laptop border search case study—that may be quite harmful to the
Office. An Office of Goodness may gain collegiality points, internally,
when it takes public hits for its agency’s position. But one of the reasons
that the agency follows the Office’s advice is in order to at least
221 Cf. Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35
HOUS. L. REV. 623, 648 (1998) (“Nongovernmental actors do not work alone. . . . [T]hey
invariably seek governmental officials who will act as allies and sponsors for the norms they are
promoting. Once engaged, these governmental norm sponsors work inside bureaucracies and
governmental structures to promote the same changes inside organized government that
nongovernmental norm entrepreneurs are urging from the outside.”).
222 For example, it was civil rights advocacy groups who dreamed up CRCL as an entity within
DHS, the first such inward-focused civil rights or civil liberties office.
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somewhat soften or prevent criticism from the advocacy groups. If
following Office advice does not accomplish that goal, the Office’s
internal influence will decline. So, in the laptop border search situation,
we saw that CRCL made several recommendations made in its impact
assessment, each accepted by CBP. But accepting those suggestions
seems to have elicited no good will at all from the advocacy community.
The result is likely to influence the CBP audience for the next set of
recommendations, as agency officials question whether a CRCLproposed reform really has any external constituency.
A final way in which advocacy groups can increase or maintain the
influence of an Office of Goodness is by making its predictions come
true. If an Office predicts a firestorm of public concern about a
particular policy, should that policy be implemented and become
known, it is advocates that foment the firestorm, if they can. (Efforts to
create a firestorm failed in the NCTC example, above.) And if the Office
argues within its agency that a policy (perhaps after modifications) is
fine, it is advocates that refrain from fomenting a firestorm. The point is
not that advocacy groups carry out their efforts in order to support the
Office of Goodness, but rather that if the Office proves wrong in its
predictions, it is likely to lose influence. This creates all the more
incentive for Office staff to discuss issues with various groups in
advance, where possible.
Law and Courts. For many reasons, advocates often prefer law talk
to policy talk: legal rules govern more than one agency; can outlast a
single administration; may be court-enforceable; and, perhaps most
important, resonate with their rights-based politics/orientation. 223 But
Office of Goodness reference to law is double-edged, for several reasons.
On the one hand, reference to legal obligations is extremely powerful,
perhaps even trumping of other concerns. On the other hand, for an
Office of Goodness that is not in a General Counsel’s office, framing an
issue as a legal one can set up the losing side of an intra-agency conflict;
it is lawyers in the General Counsel’s office, not Office of Goodness
staff—even if they are also lawyers—who play the institutional lead role
with respect to legal questions. In addition, if a question is framed as
legal and is likely to be litigated, that cedes authority to the courts,
which may well decide against the views of the Office of Goodness.
Agency dynamics and the state of the legal precedent will thus dictate
whether Offices of Goodness are more likely to frame their
commitments in policy rather than legal terms.
All that said, Offices of Goodness are likely to lean heavily on court
decisions that agree with them, or even tilt a bit their way; in the
223 See, e.g., STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND
POLITICAL CHANGE (1974); see also MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY
REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994).
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political economy of an agency, such decisions are valuable currency.
Offices may also make legal arguments with respect to issues in which
court authority is mixed or that have not yet been litigated in federal
court. On the other hand, if many courts have come out against a
particular position, that dampens the availability of that position for an
Office of Goodness; it would be unlikely to take a legal position more
protective than court decisions on an issue that has been repeatedly
litigated. So for example, in the laptop border search case study, above,
at the time CRCL’s impact assessment was completed, two district
courts had rendered opinions questioning the right of the government
to conduct laptop searches absent reasonable suspicion, 224 but the
federal courts of appeals had, as of the time of the impact assessment,
reversed in both cases and uniformly upheld such searches. No internal
office like CRCL is likely to opine publicly, and adversely to its agency’s
frequently asserted litigation position, that those courts are simply
wrong.
***
Offices of Goodness are inherently under siege; efforts to push
them aside and render them irrelevant are part and parcel of their
agency’s mission focus. To resist certainly does not require that all the
external sources of influence just discussed operate in their favor. And
indeed it is unlikely that this can occur: as Carpenter and Krause have
explained in work on agency reputation, “the audiences are multiple and
diverse, so satisfying one audience (e.g., a congressional committee)
often means perturbing another (e.g., the media).” 225 But absent support
from any external constituency, an Office of Goodness will be hard
pressed to retain any influence.
The next section examines how to improve the odds that what
influence they have is used in service of their assigned value—how, that
is, they can maintain their commitment, and avoid cooptation or
capture.
B.

Commitment

Offices of Goodness are likely to experience erosion in their staff’s
commitment to the assigned value, Goodness, as both collegial and
224 See United States v. Cotterman, No. CR 07–1207–TUC–RCC, 2009 WL 465028 (D. Ariz.
Feb. 24, 2009), rev’d, 637 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated and aff’d en banc on other grounds,
673 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2013); United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999 (C.D. Cal. 2006), rev’d,
523 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2008).
225 Daniel P. Carpenter & George A. Krause, Reputation and Public Administration, 72 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 26, 27 (2011).
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careerist pressures take their toll. By collegial pressures, I mean the
ordinary impact of working with mission-focused colleagues not in the
Office of Goodness. As Herbert Simon said in his foundational work on
administration, a person “does not live or months or years in a
particular position in an organization, exposed to some streams of
communication, shielded from others, without the most profound
effects upon what he knows, believes, attends to, hopes, wishes,
emphasizes, fears, and proposes.” 226 By careerist pressures, I mean the
impact of an anticipated career path within the agency, which will push
Office of Goodness staff to develop reputations as “team players” whose
approach meshes well and enhances the agency’s primary mission. I
suggest below that efforts to resist capture must counter both. Those
who want an Office of Goodness to avoid it must ensure that Office staff
conceptualize Goodness advocates as part of their reference group—and
that Office activities remain sufficiently public for that reference group
to sanction Office staff in some way if they fail to maintain
commitment. In addition, Office staff must have available and attractive
career paths involving Goodness advocacy.
Numerous scholars have written about professional identification
in government agencies, and how professional commitments and
professional reference groups, and the cultural distinctions they
produce, can be outcome-determinative. Magill and Vermeule recast a
good deal of administrative law in these terms:
The ongoing contest over the roles of expertise, legalism, and politics
in administrative law can thus be viewed in sociological terms as a
contest among different types of professionals, with different types of
training and priorities. Legal rules and institutional structures that
empower scientists or engineers will conduce to a technocratic
agency culture, while rules and structures that empower lawyers will
carry in their wake the distinctive culture of lawyers. 227

In study after study, the empowering of one or another
professional group at a particular agency influences that agency’s
approach to its assignments and challenges. 228 Indeed, James Q. Wilson
argues that the very essence of being a professional is to be
someone who receives important occupational rewards from a
reference group whose membership is limited to people who have
undergone specialized formal education and have accepted a groupdefined code of proper conduct. The more the individual allows his
HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR, at xvi (3d ed., 1976).
Magill & Vermeule, Allocating Power, supra note 14, at 1077–78.
228 See, e.g., KATZMANN, supra note 16 (lawyers vs. economists); Jerry L. Mashaw & David L.
Harfst, Inside the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration: Legal Determinants of
Bureaucratic Organization and Performance, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 443 (1990) (lawyers and
economists vs. engineers).
226
227
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or her behavior to be influenced by the desire to obtain rewards from
this reference group, the more professional is his or her
orientation. 229

Accordingly, “the way such a person defines his or her task may
reflect more the standards of the external reference group than the
preferences of the internal management.” 230 And “institutionalist”
sociologists agree that professional networks exert real influence over
their participants who work in scattered organizations. 231
So for values closely associated with a particular profession, no
doubt hiring a critical mass of such professionals can assist in
safeguarding the value. Again, to quote Wilson, “Politicians and interest
groups know that professionals can define tasks in ways that are hard
for administrators to alter, and so one strategy for changing an
organization is to induce it to recruit a professional cadre whose values
are congenial to those desiring the change.” 232 In one example of this
strategy, we learn from recent work, lawyers within national security
agencies are assigned to ensure a value I will summarize by the term
“lawfulness.” 233 Other examples abound. 234 But what if the profession in
question does not homogenously embrace the relevant value, Goodness?
Lawyers’ professional commitments may include lawfulness as an
overriding value (although the professional value assigned to clientrepresentation 235 competes rather thoroughly). But taking the example
of DHS’s CRCL, and its more contested assigned values of civil rights
and civil liberties, the legal profession is certainly not uniformly
committed to those values. 236 After all, in every civil rights case there are
lawyers on both sides. Accordingly, simple professional ties are far from
enough to keep Office staff committed to those values, even if they are
all lawyers. What is needed is ties not to the legal profession as a whole,
but to a much more specific professional community. (If such a
professional community is non-existent or inchoate, the task will be
vastly more difficult.) In the case of a civil rights Office, for example, the
WILSON, BUREAUCRACY, supra note 6, at 60.
Id.
231 See, e.g., MEYER & SCOTT, supra note 219; THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN
ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991).
232 WILSON, BUREAUCRACY, supra note 6, at 64.
233 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 28.
234 See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 226; see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with
Disabilities Act as Risk Regulation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1479, 1498–1501 (2001) (public health
professionals).
235 See, e.g., Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client
Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976); Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A
Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities, 11 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 611.
236 My point is in some tension with Laura Dickinson’s analysis of JAG Corps lawyers, whom
she finds dedicated to human rights norms via their commitment to the idea of the rule of law. See
Dickinson, Military Lawyers, supra note 29, at 21–22.
229
230
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key would seem to be sufficient staff connection to the civil rights
community that its values remain salient and influential
notwithstanding the contrary pressures inherent in the Office’s position
within its agency. The Office benefits greatly, that is, if its staff
conceptualize themselves as, for example, “civil rights lawyers” rather
than “lawyers in a civil rights office.”
Connections to a corner of a profession depend on some
combination of hiring, networking, and career paths. The first of these is
the most obvious; Office of Goodness can hire experienced staff from
organizations that share its assigned value. 237 In practice, this strategy
may run into implementation problems because of constraints on
federal hiring under the civil service human resources rules. 238 But
assuming hiring managers can hire more or less who they choose,
bringing in new employees directly from advocacy groups is a common
strategy for Offices of Goodness that seek to ensure staff commitment.
For example, Douglas NeJaime explains that during the first Obama
Administration, many civil rights offices hired numerous attorneys
“with significant cause lawyering experience,” “signal[ing] the likelihood
of increased action on issues important to the organizations from which
these lawyers came.”239 And Kenneth Bamberger and Deirdre Mulligan’s
account of two federal privacy offices similarly stresses that hiring staff
experienced in the “privacy field” was crucial to the greater success of
the DHS office, compared to the Department of State office. 240
But even if they were hired from a Goodness organization, as staff
gain experience within the government, that affiliation is likely to fade
and their reference group to shift to their more immediate peers. An
Office of Goodness can push back against this shift by promoting
opportunities for its staff to network with Goodness advocates, sending
them to conferences, workshops, and the like. In addition, as Sallyanne
Payton has written, “[s]tarch for the backbone of weak professional
groups generally must come from outside.” 241 If the reference group
strategy is going to perform the function of reinforcing Office staff
237 While his topic was not an Office of Goodness, in his magisterial analysis of the Federal
Drug Administration, Daniel Carpenter similarly attributes much of its success to its leaders’
hiring strategy. See DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER, supra note 15 (describing the
FDA’s pattern of hiring experts who shared its value commitments, and their willingness to join
the agency because of its excellent reputation).
238 Federal hiring managers for civil service jobs can hire only from a list of eligible applicants,
called a “certificate list,” which is assembled not by the hiring office but by the agency’s human
resources department. Particularly because an Office of Goodness is such a small part of its
agency, HR personnel are likely to be quite uninformed about how to evaluate applications,
leading, in my experience, to frequent misalignments between the composition of the list and the
Office’s own preferences. (Offices of General Counsel are less constrained, by statute.)
239 Douglas NeJaime, Cause Lawyers Inside the State, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 649, 651 (2009).
240 Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking, supra note 6.
241 See Payton, supra note 207, at 386.
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commitment to Goodness, it may also be necessary for Office activities
to be sufficiently public that the outside Goodness advocates can punish
Office capture with techniques such as harsh questions at those
conferences or other sorts of private or public criticism.
Likely even more important is the staff’s expectation about their
own career paths. If Office of Goodness staff think of their own likely
path as limited to other agency offices—offices where Goodness, by
definition, is less central—that is unhelpful for maintaining their zeal.
But what if they see more possibilities in which Goodness remains
important? This could be the case if promotion within the Office is
available and depends on demonstrated commitment, or if they
contemplate going to work for a different agency’s Office of Goodness
that shares the same value commitment or for an advocacy
organization. All these prospects would encourage staff to safeguard
their own reputations for commitment to Goodness and, less calculated
but no less important, to maintain their connections to Goodness
advocates. 242 And only if that happens will designating and empowering
an agency employee or group of agency employees to increase Goodness
have much chance of actually accomplishing that end.
CONCLUSION
This Article has explored an important but essentially unstudied
institutional device used to induce large bureaucratic governmental
agencies to heed certain “precarious values,” notwithstanding the
tension between those values and the agencies’ primary commitments. I
began by showing how one important Office of Goodness exercised real
but limited influence in four controversies. I then used those examples
to inform detailed analysis of the tools Offices of Goodness may use,
and the prerequisites for Office effectiveness. The Article demonstrates
the importance of a wider lens—one that incorporates subsidiary agency
offices, of many types, and a much longer list of bureaucratic
techniques—for many of the currently hot topics in “internal separation
of powers.”
In the realm of policy as well as research, in the Article’s
introduction, I mentioned that the Office of Goodness strategy is being
implemented as a solution for a very high-profile controversy. The
Obama administration has placed a Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer
in the National Security Agency, and has endorsed adding a panel of
civil liberties advocates to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court

242 Cf. KATZMANN, supra note 16 (discussing the career paths of FTC economists and lawyers
and their influence on staff values).
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processes for significant cases. 243 Some of the insights just developed
may inform the institutional design choices of would-be reformers, so
that reforms are more likely to actually serve the “Goodness” values of
privacy and civil liberties. At the NSA, it is easy to see pitfalls. How
could a complaint system be constructed when the subjects of
surveillance do not know their own status? Would an NSA Privacy and
Civil Liberties Officer be empowered to pursue those values broadly
conceived, or limited to more narrow conceptions of lawfulness? If the
latter, it would be difficult for the new Officer to avoid (or surmount)
conflict with the General Counsel. Would NSA Privacy and Civil
Liberties Office staff be able to discuss or report publically about any
problems or recommendations? If not, what kind of external
reinforcement can they rely upon to maintain their influence within the
NSA, and how long can we expect their commitment to last? And so on.
I address these issues at length in a forthcoming article. 244
The idea of harnessing adversarial process for the FISA court seems
less fraught. American law has a long tradition of bringing outsider
lawyers into litigation processes; the contours of the role of governmentpaid challenger—e.g., public defender—are solidly established in the
legal profession. I surmise that this would make role commitment far
easier to maintain. Moreover, external influence-reinforcement seems
less crucial when there is a formally structured decisionmaking process
with its own norms of reasoned elaboration. 245
The overall point—and this is the Article’s most important
practical lesson—is that Office of Goodness efficacy should not be taken
for granted. Unless the goal is purely cosmetic, a new Office’s tools must
be carefully prepared, and its influence and commitment purposefully
produced and maintained. In identifying and analyzing this critical
administrative strategy, this Article offers insight about how to make it
work, and also has opened up additional research questions for further
exploration.

See supra Introduction.
Margo Schlanger, Intelligence Legalism and the National Security Agency’s Civil Liberties
Gap, 6 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2495844.
245 I don’t mean to be naïve in making this point. Of course there is abundant reason in
litigation settings to worry that “the haves come out ahead.” See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves”
Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974). But
in litigation, the “have-nots” can at least get a seat at the table and a chance to speak. Without
external reinforcement, an Office of Goodness may be denied even access.
243
244
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